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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the appointment of designated directors on boards of directors.  
Designated director appointments are uncontested board appointments by activist investors, 
whereby normal nominating and voting election procedures are circumvented.  Instances such as 
these, where directors are appointed rather than elected, are a form of shareholder access to the 
proxy.  In this dissertation, new evidence is provided that is relevant to the proxy access debate 
by investigating the hypothesis that firms with appointed designated directors have different firm 
and governance characteristics than firms with elected directors.  In particular, the following 
questions are asked: what are the shareholder wealth effects surrounding the announcement of (i) 
a designated director on a board, (ii) the appointment of a new designated director to a board, 
and (iii) a designated director continuing service on the board?  Also, what firm and governance 
characteristics lead to the appointment of a designated director on the board?  The answers to 
these questions can help determine whether firms with better corporate governance structures are 
more likely to have designated directors appointed to their boards because they are serving all 
shareholders‘ interests, or whether firms with worse corporate governance are less likely to have 
designated directors appointed because of the board of directors‘ insulation.
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1. Introduction   
The topic of shareholder voting has become an active research area, with most of the 
studies investigating the effect of shareholder voting rights on firm value (Yermack 2010).  Until 
recently, most research on shareholder voting focused on episodes of conflict or activism 
affecting relatively small groups of firms and in particular on contested elections (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo 1989, Pound 1988, Mulherin and Poulsen 1998).  An area yet to be examined in the 
finance literature, and the focus of this paper, is that of designated director appointments.  
Designated director appointments are uncontested board appointments by activist investors, 
whereby normal nominating and voting election procedures are circumvented.  Instances such as 
these, where directors are appointed rather than elected, are a form of shareholder access to the 
proxy. 
In this dissertation, new evidence is provided that is relevant to the proxy access debate 
by investigating the hypothesis that firms with appointed designated directors have different firm 
and governance characteristics than firms with elected directors.  In particular, the following 
questions are asked: what are the shareholder wealth effects surrounding the announcement of (i) 
a designated director on a board, (ii) the appointment of a new designated director to a board, 
and (iii) a designated director continuing service on the board?  Also, what firm and governance 
characteristics lead to the appointment of a designated director on the board?  The answers to 
these questions can help determine whether firms with better corporate governance structures are 
more likely to have designated directors appointed to their boards because they are serving all 
shareholders‘ interests, or whether firms with worse corporate governance are less likely to have 
designated directors appointed because of the board of directors‘ insulation.   
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1.1. Conditions Under Which Designated Directors Are Appointed 
Designated directors are also referred to as representative or constituency directors 
(Morris, Herzeca, and Kamps 2008).  Morris et al. (2008) argue that investors negotiate hard for 
the right to appoint these directors on their behalf because they believe that these directors will 
protect their interests.  The authors further note that because these designated directors have 
access to the board of directors, and that there will likely be conflict as to whether designated 
directors are serving solely the interest of the investor that designated them, or if their fidelity 
runs to all of the company‘s shareholders (Morris et al. 2008).  
Designated director appointments are uncontested solicitations, and the appointments of 
these directors are forced upon the firm.  Often investors designate a director to the company‘s 
board as part of a negotiated agreement between the investor and the company.
1
  The reasons for 
the negotiated agreement are varied, and cannot readily be determined without examining each 
director‘s appointment individually.2  Activist investors routinely appoint a designated director to 
the board on their behalf, sometimes as part of a proxy fight concession, while others designate 
directors as part of a supply agreement with a subsidiary (Agrawal and Nasser 2010).  At times, 
directors are designated related to acquisitions and mergers.  Frequently if a shareholder owns a 
controlling predetermined percentage of shares, then the shareholder is permitted board 
representation.  In all of the antecedent scenarios, the directors were appointed to the board, 
thereby circumventing the standard uncontested election process, in which management sponsors 
a slate of nominees and subsequently shareholders cast a ―withhold‖ or ―for‖ vote for the 
                                                 
1
 Agrawal and Nasser (2010) discuss how designated directors are categorized as activist investors.   
2
 There are 3,908 unique designated director appointments for the years 1996 through 2009.  A sub-sample was 
examined using data from the 2006 proxy year, which showed the breakdown of reasons directors were designated, 
including: 1.48% of the designated directors were appointed on behalf of an agreement with an activist investor, 
3.70% as a proxy fight concession, 2.22% as part of a supply agreement, 6.67% because of a company spin-off, 
36.30% were acquisition-related, 4.44% because of a merger, 23.70% on behalf of an investment company, and 
17.78% because of a controlling shareholder agreement. 
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nominees.  In the case of the appointment of a designated director, outside parties are permitted 
direct access to the target firm‘s proxy. 
Shareholder access to the proxy has been a highly controversial and longstanding issue.  
The SEC first considered passing such rules as long ago as 1942, and then again in 1977.  The 
SEC repeatedly revisited this proxy access issue, seeking public comments in 2003, 2007, and 
lastly in July 2009.  It was not until August 25, 2010, that the SEC adopted Rule 14a-11, which 
allows shareholders with at least three percent of ownership for at least three years the right to 
have their own board candidates listed on the proxy ballot without the need for a proxy fight.
3
  
This long-sought proxy access rule was frozen unexpectedly on October 4, 2010, by the SEC, 
pending an aggressive legal challenge by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business 
Roundtable.
4
     
There is significant disagreement over whether shareholder access to the proxy is 
beneficial or not.  Advocates of proxy access urge that it will help hold boards of directors 
accountable to owners; proxy access will make it easier for shareholders to take an active role in 
monitoring managers and the incumbent board by the threat of replacement.  Critics argue that 
the current system is optimal, since shareholders remain free to sell their shares if they are 
dissatisfied with management performance.  They believe proxy access will give conflicted 
shareholders, like unions and state pensions, power that they will use to pursue their political 
                                                 
3
 SEC Release No. 33-9136 (August 25, 2010).  Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Pub. L. 111-203, H.R. 4173, Section 971) specifically recognizes the SEC‘s authority to require 
publicly traded firms to include shareholder nominees on the corporate proxy (signed into law on July 21, 2010).  
Moreover, shareholders are allowed to aggregate their holdings to meet the three percent requirement.  Also, if 
ownership requirements are met, shareholders are allowed to include one nominee or up to 25 percent of the board, 
whichever is greater.  For example, if a board had three members, shareholders could nominate one; if a board had 
eight members, up to two nominees could be proposed.  ―Smaller‖ reporting companies are subject to the rule only 
after a three-year phase in period. 
4
 Business Roundtable and U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Complaint filed 
September 29, 2010. The lawsuit asserts, among other things, that the SEC exceeded its authority, violated 
companies‘ First and Fifth Amendment rights, erred in apprising the costs of proxy access, ignored evidence of 
adverse consequences of the rule, and ignored state laws on proxy access.  The SEC filed its response in January 
2011, and the case will be heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. circuit April 7, 2011. 
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objectives at the expense of ordinary shareholders.  The question is whether the benefits of the 
shareholder proxy access rule will significantly outweigh its purported costs.  Furthermore, a 
secondary question is whether companies will implement defensive strategies in the wake of 
proxy access to limit shareholder power (in the same way that boards implemented defensive 
tactics in response to the hostile takeovers in the mid-1980s).  Next, the opposing perspectives on 
the topic of shareholder access to the proxy are briefly discussed. 
 
1.2. Support for Shareholder Access to the Proxy  
Supporters of shareholder access to the proxy believe that it will lead to a more 
accountable, responsive, and effective board (Bebchuk 2003, Bebchuk 2007, Becker, 
Bergstresser, and Subramanian 2010).  Proxy access would let shareholders place their own 
nominees for director on the company‘s proxy card when they are dissatisfied with the board and 
want to run their own candidates.  Some argue that competition in the director election process is 
desirable, and that giving institutional shareholders more influence on the board will likely 
benefit all shareholders (Bebchuk 2003, Bebchuk and Hirst 2010).  Moreover, proponents 
maintain that the new rule will help shareholders oust directors of corporations that are 
underperforming (Bebchuk 2007, Grundfest 2009).  Currently, the odds of a director being 
ousted at an election are negligible (Bebchuk 2007), as elucidated by former SEC chairman 
Arthur Levitt, Jr. in his statement, ―A director has a better chance of being struck by lightning 
than losing an election.‖5   
A central premise of the proxy access rule is that election contests are onerous and 
prohibitively expensive, as evidenced by a dearth of contested elections in publicly traded firms, 
whereas under the new rule election contests could be initiated more easily (Bebchuk 2007, 
                                                 
5
 Arthur Levitt, Jr., Stocks Populi, Wall Street Journal, Section A14, October 27, 2006. 
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Cohn, Gillan, and Hartzell 2010).  Bebchuk (2007) notes that during the period of 1996 – 2005 
there were only eight contested elections with rival slates among companies with a market 
capitalization of over $200 million.  The low incidence is a result of the required cost of filing 
proxy statements, risk of legal liability, and solicitation costs (Bebchuk 2007).  For example, 
Goodman and Olson (2008) report that dissidents spent $5.9 million trying to gain board control 
at El Paso Corporation (receiving 46.9% of the votes).  Similarly, during 2001 and 2002, Sam 
Wyly of Ranger Governance ran a dissident slate at Computer Associates, ultimately settling for 
the addition of one new independent director to the board (and a $10 million cash payment).  The 
costs of the campaign were reportedly $12 million.
6
  Gantchev (2010) estimates that the costs of 
an activist campaign average $10.5 million, half of which is attributable to the proxy contest 
itself.  The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) assert that proxy access will ―invigorate board 
elections and make boards more responsive to shareowners, more thoughtful about whom they 
nominate to serve as directors and more vigilant in their oversight of companies.‖7  The CII 
further praises the rule as, ―a crucial mechanism that gives shareowners a meaningful voice in 
corporate board elections.‖   
Advocates of proxy access argue that current shareholder tools are ineffective (Bebchuk 
2003, Becker et al. 2010, Gillan and Starks 2007, Cohn et al. 2010).  To illustrate, with regard to 
the issue of majority voting for directors, proponents cite that not all U.S. companies have 
adopted it, and that many firms still elect directors using the plurality standard.
8
  Indeed, even 
with a majority of withheld votes, under the plurality system in an uncontested director election a 
nominee only needs one ―for‖ vote to be elected.  This demonstrates the difficulty with unseating 
                                                 
6
 See http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2002/07/25/188661/CA-and-Ranger-end-proxy-fight.htm.  
7
 Council of Institutional Investors, U.S. Financial Regulatory Reform: The Investors’ Perspective, July 2009. 
8
 Erik Krusch, Corporate governance: Majority Rules…Except When It Doesn’t, Westlaw, January 26, 2011.  
However, over 80 percent of S&P500 and 60 percent of Russell 1000 firms have majority voting policies or bylaw 
provisions (as of January 2011).  
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a director with only management‘s proposed slate of nominees.  Majority voting is also 
perceived as ineffective because it may incorrectly indicate shareholder disapproval of a director 
when certain quorum provisions exist (Sjostrom and Kim 2007).  For instance, under 
California‘s statutory majority vote requirement, election of a director requires not only a 
majority vote, but also the affirmative vote of more than half of the shares required for a quorum 
for the meeting.
9
  Thus, it is possible that the director in question would not obtain enough votes 
simply because too few shareholders cast their votes, and thereby would not be elected on that 
basis.  Furthermore, the majority vote issue was previously not a concern due to broker 
discretionary voting in uncontested elections (Cai, Garner, and Walkling 2009).  Brokers 
formerly had the authority to cast votes in uncontested elections when their clients failed to 
provide them with voting instructions, so companies could always expect that a sufficient 
number of votes would be cast in director elections.  Nevertheless, in July 2009 the SEC 
approved an amendment to NYSE Rule 452 that eliminated broker discretionary voting authority 
in director elections when a client did not provide voting instructions.
10
  Removal of the broker 
discretionary voting now is a major impediment to electing directors when quorum requirements 
are an issue. 
 
1.3. Opposition to Shareholder Access to the Proxy  
Those opposed to proxy access argue that shareholders already have meaningful 
opportunities to participate in director elections, such as the aforementioned tools which included 
withholding votes for directors, employing majority voting standards, and utilizing the 
                                                 
9
 Apple Computer, Inc., DEF 14A 2009 Annual Definitive Proxy Statement.  In some cases, such as at Apple 
Computer, Inc., this quorum requirement is equal to just over 25 percent of the outstanding shares.  
10
 SEC Release No. 34-60215 (July 1, 2009). 
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elimination of broker voting.
11
  Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008) find that ―just vote no‖ 
campaigns, which occur when activists encourage shareholders to withhold votes for directors, 
are effective in incentivizing boards to take actions in the best interest of shareholders, resulting 
in high rates of CEO replacement, improved operating performance, and a high frequency of 
strategic changes in the subsequent year.  These benefits arise even if no director is ousted from 
the board as a consequence of a majority withheld vote.  The empirical evidence demonstrates 
that ―just vote no‖ campaigns can be highly efficient, low-cost mechanisms for the positive 
expression of shareholder voice, notwithstanding their precatory nature.
12
  To illustrate, 
according to Georgeson‘s 2009 Annual Corporate Governance Review survey of S&P 1500 
companies, there were 79 directors in 2009 who received a majority withhold votes and 469 
directors who received a withhold vote in excess of 30 percent of the votes cast.
13
  Cai, Garner, 
and Walkling (2009) find evidence that firms announcing majority voting earn significantly 
positive abnormal returns, indicating that majority voting improves governance (as evidenced by 
higher CEO turnover and lower CEO compensation) and firm value.  Yermack (2010) estimates 
the repeal of broker-voting in director elections deprives management nominees of a cushion of 
approximately ten to fifteen percent of votes cast.  Still others suggest that, on balance, it is 
unlikely that the effects of proxy access will even be material (Kahan and Rock 2010), in that a 
                                                 
11
 Bainbridge (2003) argues that there are reasons to think that more control by shareholders may not be so positive. 
12
 Gretchen Morgenson, Too Many ‘No’ votes to be Ignored, N.Y. Times, September 20, 2009.  Recent data suggest 
that ―just vote no‖ campaigns are gaining steam among shareholders.  The percentage of directors standing 
unopposed who had at least 20 percent of votes cast market to withhold authority for their re-election increased from 
5.5 percent in 2008 to 9.8 percent in 2009 [for 40 percent withheld it increased from 1 percent to 2.1 percent].  A 
total of 84 directors at 48 companies failed to garner majority support through August 2009, triple the incidence 
observed in 2008. 
13
 2009 Annual Corporate Governance Review, Georgeson, available at 
http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2009.pdf .  Directors receiving withhold/against votes of 15 
percent or greater jumped more than 68 percent from 2008 to 2009, with more than 1,000 directors at more than 375 
firms receiving such votes.   
 8 
 
shareholder access regime would not lead to the election of shareholder-nominated directors 
because it would not eliminate the costs of running a dissident slate.
14
 
Moreover, many of the rule‘s opponents argue that the shareholder access to the proxy 
will enhance the influence of special interest groups, such as union and state pension funds, at 
the expense of retail investors (Bainbridge 2003).  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce said the SEC 
―is responding to the campaign of a small group of special interest activist investors while 
ignoring the needs of the vast majority of investors who will never be able to use proxy 
access.‖15  Likewise, many fear that activists could nominate special interest directors that would 
force companies to focus on their own short-term political goals, rather than the creation of long-
term shareholder value (Bainbridge 2003).  For example, Karpoff and Rice (1989) argue that 
managers who face frequent shareholder votes might spend large amounts of time campaigning 
and pursuing frivolous short-term policies that cater to blocks of voters but compromise the 
firm‘s long-term interests.   Richard Templeton, chief executive officer of Texas Instruments, 
said proxy access ―would promote a focus on short-term interests and could result in what are 
essentially annual proxy contests… distracting management and board attention from the 
creation of long-term shareholder value.‖16  Certain dissenters of the proposed rule suggest that, 
―Rather than focusing on good corporate governance, the SEC has given special interests the 
ability to hold the board hostage on narrow issues at the expense of other shareholders.‖17     
In general, opponents of shareholder access cite two ways in which the existence of 
contests would generate costs: (i) disruption and waste of resources caused by contested 
                                                 
14
 Letter from Robert Todd Lang and Charles Nathan, Co-Chairs, The task Force on Shareholder Proposals, ABA 
Section of Business law, to the SEC (June 13, 2003) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/aba061303.htm.  ―New mechanisms to increase on a routine basis 
shareholder participation in director selection will not be worth their costs because they will not likely result in 
significant numbers of shareholder-nominated directors being selected.‖ 
15
 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Press Release (August 25, 2010). 
16
 See http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-714.pdf  
17
 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Press Release (August 25, 2010). 
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elections, and (ii) discouragement of potentially good directors from serving.  Critics paint a 
picture in which shareholder access would lead to large-scale disruption of corporate 
management (Lipton and Rosenblum 2003).  They warn that threatened managers and directors 
would launch ―a full-scale election contest, at least from the company‘s side, replete with 
multiple mailings, institutional investor road shows, and full page newspaper fight letters.‖18  
These contests would require the company to incur substantial out-of-pocket costs, thereby 
wasting company resources, and diverting management‘s effort and attention (Lipton and 
Rosenblum 2003).  Lipton and Rosenblum further (2003) argue that high-quality directors may 
be less willing to serve on boards if they must face competition from shareholder-sponsored 
candidates.  Shareholder access, it is argued, ―would dissuade from board service individuals 
who are not prepared to stand for election in a contested election.‖19  Furthermore, it ―would 
likely exacerbate the retention and recruitment problem, resulting in an even smaller pool of 
well-qualified individuals willing to serve on corporate boards.‖20  
At the heart of the proxy access argument is whether it will be used as leverage by 
activists to obtain concessions from companies or as a soap box to voice disagreements with 
company policy.  A subsequent question then arises whether special interest groups act in their 
own best interest at the detriment of other shareholders.  Designated directors include several 
categories of special interest groups, such as activist investors and union appointed directors.  A 
comprehensive study would reveal the effect, if any, of designated directors on board and firm 
                                                 
18
 Letter from Robert Todd Lang and Charles Nathan, Co-Chairs, The task Force on Shareholder Proposals, ABA 
Section of Business law, to the SEC (June 13, 2003) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/aba061303.htm. 
19
 Letter from Robert Todd Lang and Charles Nathan, Co-Chairs, The task Force on Shareholder Proposals, ABA 
Section of Business law, to the SEC (June 13, 2003) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/aba061303.htm. 
20
 Letter from David M. Silk, Chairman, Task Force on Potential Changes to the Proxy Rules, The Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York, to SEC (June 13, 2002), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/tfpcprabny061303.htm.  
 10 
 
performance.  Bebchuk (2007) argues that special interest groups have a myopic view which 
hurts firm performance and negatively impacts shareholder wealth.  If this is the case, then there 
are important policy implications for the SEC‘s proposed shareholder access to the proxy. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a comprehensive 
history of shareholder access to the proxy and other election developments.  Section 3 details the 
data and univariate summary statistics.  Section 4 discusses hypotheses and the wealth effects to 
shareholders.  Section 5 interprets logistic regressions, and Section 6 concludes the paper and 
suggests areas for future research. 
 
2. Shareholder Access to the Proxy 
2.1. History of Proxy Access 
The ability of shareholders to utilize the proxy rules for purposes of nominating directors 
has been a focus of the SEC for many decades.  The earliest attempt to give shareholders access 
to the company‘s proxy materials dates back to 1942, when the SEC solicited comments on a 
staff proposal regarding shareholders‘ right to nominate directors.21  Although the SEC didn‘t 
adopt that proposal, it did revisit the issue again in 1977, likewise asking for comments from the 
public, and yet again not adopting the proposal.
22
 
In 2003, the SEC yet again sought comments on the same issue, except that in the 2003 
proposal, shareholders would obtain proxy access only for the two years following a triggering 
event (either a 35 percent minimum withhold vote in a director election or a majority vote by 
shareholders electing to make the company subject to proxy access).  Moreover, only 
                                                 
21
 Securities and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019, Before the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Congress, 1st Session, at 17-19 (1943), (testimony of 
Chairman Ganson Purcell). 
22
 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination 
and Election of Directors (2003). 
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shareholders who held at least five percent of the company‘s stock for a minimum of two years 
could make nominations, and these nominations could only relate to a minority of the board 
seats.
23
  Although this proposal was highly controversial, it was initially adopted.  Both the 
Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce were strongly opposed.  Republican 
Chairman Donaldson ended up not pushing for an adoption of the proxy rules and resigned in 
2005.
24
  His successor, Chairman Christopher Cox, was not regarded as a champion of proxy 
access, and thus proxy access was considered inert. 
Dissatisfied proponents of proxy access therefore decided to adopt an alternative strategy.  
In 2005, the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) made a 
shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8 at American International Group (AIG) seeking to 
implement a homemade proxy access regime.  The SEC took the position that AIG could omit 
this proposal; AIG did and AFSCME sued.
25
  In 2006, it was appealed and ruled that the 
proposal could not be excluded.  In its opinion, the court was highly critical of the SEC, 
criticizing it for changing its position on the meaning of its rules without either acknowledging 
or so explaining the reasons for it.  The ruling meant that the SEC had to act, both to provide 
clarity in the law and to remedy the shortcoming the court had noted.   
In July 2007, the SEC released for comment two alternative proposals.  One resembled 
the 2003 proxy access proposal, while the other provided a reasoned basis for the position that a 
shareholder proposal trying to implement proxy access for a single company can be excluded 
                                                 
23
 Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60790 (proposed October 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274). 
24
 Stephen Labaton, Donaldson Announces Resignation as S.E.C. Chairman, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2005. 
25
 AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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under Rule 14a-8.  Each proposal was supported by only three of the five commissioners.
26
  In 
November 2007, the SEC adopted the second proposal.
27
 
A year later, President Obama was elected. Cox resigned and was replaced by Chairman 
Mary Schapiro.  The SEC, in July 2009, released another variant of a proposed proxy access rule, 
and again it resulted in a majority vote.
28
  This 2009 proposal was broader than the 2003 
proposal. The latest proposal removed the requirement of a triggering event, thereby lowering 
the percentage ownership requirement for making a nomination to a range from one to five 
percent, depending on company size, and it also shortened the required holding period to one 
year.
29
  
Predictably reactions were mixed.  But even some of those who favored proxy access in 
general suggested that the 2009 proposals be made more restrictive.  In its comment letter to the 
SEC, Barclays Global Investors favored both the reintroduction of the triggers in the 2003 
proposal and an increase in the ownership threshold needed to make a nomination to five to 
fifteen percent, depending on the company‘s market capitalization.30  T. Rowe Price Associates 
favored a five percent ownership threshold for all companies, noting that it owned more than five 
percent of the stock in more than 350 U.S. operating companies.  Moreover, managerial interests 
raised the argument that the proposed rule exceeded the SEC‘s rulemaking authority.31 
To insulate any rule against such a legal attack, the SEC delayed action until Congress, as 
part of the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, granted the disputed authority to the SEC.
32
  
                                                 
26
 Nicholas Rummell, SEC Splits Proxy Access Votes as Cox Says ‘Yea’ to Two Proposals, Financial Week, 
July 25, 2007. 
27
 The SEC Denies Proxy Access, Posting of L. Reed Walton to RiskMetrics Group. 
28
 Georgeson Inc. & Latham & Watkins LLP, Proxy Access Proposed Rules Published by SEC, Corporate 
Governance Comment, June 15, 2009. 
29
 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposed Rule, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations. 
30
 See http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9136.pdf  
31
 See BNA Corporate Law Daily, August 20, 2010. 
32
 SEC aims for proxy access rules in 2
nd 
quarter, Reuters, April 27, 2010. 
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President Obama signed the financial reform bill on July 21, 2010 and the SEC adopted the 
proxy access rule on August 25, 2010.  Under the final rule, the ownership requirement was set 
at a uniform level of three percent for all companies.
33
  Shareholders can pool their shares to 
form a group that satisfies the ownership threshold.  If more than ten other shareholders are 
solicited in the effort to form such a group, the soliciting shareholder must file a disclosure 
statement with SEC.  The three percent ownership requirement must be satisfied as of the date 
the nomination is made and for the preceding three years.   
Since nominations must be made no later than 120 days before the anniversary of the 
company‘s mailing of last year‘s proxy statement, and the nominating shareholders must intend 
to maintain their ownership until the date of the meeting, the rule effectively imposes a three-
and-one third year holding period on nominating shareholders.  As in the proposed rule, 
nominations can only be made for up to 25 percent of the board seats.  No nominations may be 
made by a shareholder who seeks to change control of the company or to gain a number of seats 
in excess of the maximum permitted by the rule.  A nominee‘s candidacy may not violate the law 
or any stock exchange rules, the nominee must meet stock exchange rule independence criteria, 
and the nominating shareholder must file a new Schedule N containing certain disclosures.
34
 
 
2.2. Other Election Developments 
Between 2003, when the SEC first released its proxy access proposal, and 2010, when the 
SEC then adopted its variant of proxy access, several notable developments occurred.  
Shareholders realized the power they can wield by ―just voting no.‖ Many companies switched 
their election regime from plurality voting to some form of majority voting.  Discretionary 
                                                 
33
 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Rule 14a-11(b)(1). However, for small very small issues (with a 
public float of less than $75 million), the effective date of the rule was delayed for three years.   
34
 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Rule 14a-11(b)(2),(5),(6),(8),(9),(10) 
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broker voting in director elections was eliminated.  Finally, changes in Delaware law now permit 
shareholders to adopt tailor-made proxy access rules.  These developments have affected the 
impact, usefulness, and need for a federal rule on proxy access.  These developments will be 
described in detail. 
 The overwhelming majority of director elections are uncontested, wherein the only 
choice of shareholders who do not want to vote for a board nominee is to mark their proxy card 
to withhold authority to vote for the director at issue.  Shareholders have long had the ability to 
return a proxy card but withhold the vote for a director.  Until recent years, shareholders have 
taken little note of it (Del Guercio et al. 2008). 
The intellectual origin of shareholders withholding their vote lies in a 1990 presentation 
to large institutional investors by former SEC Commissioner and then Stanford Law Professor 
Joeseph A. Grundfest.  Grundfest proposed that shareholders ―just vote no‖ in director elections 
(Grundfest 1993).  Though under the plurality voting system that prevailed at the time, withhold 
votes would have no legal effect no matter how many were cast, he argued that the symbolic 
impact of withhold votes, especially when coupled with shareholder communications with 
management, could act as an annual referendum on managerial performance, and ―be a catalyst 
for improved oversight that would benefit all corporate constituencies, as well as the economy at 
large‖ (Grundfest 1993).  In particular, Grundfest (1993) expected that a ―successful ‗just vote 
no‘ campaign can induce internal reforms as a result of social pressures that motivate board 
members to engage in more effective monitoring.  Alternatively, a substantial ‗just vote no‘ 
turnout can increase the probability of a hostile proxy contest or tender offer that will be treated 
more kindly by the courts precisely because it follows a significant ‗just vote no‘ turnout.‖ 
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Although there was some early enthusiasm for the initiative, it took several more years 
before Grundfest‘s proposal caught on.  The turning point probably lies in the 2004 Disney board 
election, when 45 percent of the shares were withheld from Disney CEO Michael Eisner.
35
 This 
campaign was highly publicized for a variety of reasons.  It involved a large entertainment 
company, it pitted Eisner against Roy Disney, the nephew of the legendary founder of the 
company, and because Roy Disney spent more than $2 million in campaigning for shareholders 
to vote ―no.‖36  Even though Eisner received a majority of the votes cast, the board of Disney 
immediately stripped him of his position as chairman, and Eisner resigned as CEO the following 
year.  The Disney vote no campaign showed shareholders that, in the right circumstances, a high 
withhold vote is both achievable and effective in inducing governance changes.
37
 
In the wake of the rise of withhold campaigns, it also dawned on shareholders that there 
is something wrong with an election system in which a director can be elected even if a large 
majority of shareholders is opposed.  As a result, shareholders began pushing for some form of 
majority voting.  The arguments against plurality voting struck a chord.  Within a short span, 
most large companies discarded the old plurality voting regime and adopted some form of 
majority voting.  The percentage of S&P 500 companies with a form of majority voting 
increased from 16 percent in February of 2006 to 66 percent in November 2007 to about 80 
percent in 2010.
38
  Among smaller companies, majority voting is less prevalent.  Of 5,930 
companies outside the S&P 500 that are followed by RiskMetrics, only 17 percent had adopted 
some form of majority voting by 2009 (Bebchuk and Hirst 2010).  
                                                 
35
 Walt Disney Corporation, DEF 14A 2004 Annual Definitive Proxy Statement. 
36
 See http://www.complianceweek.com/article/1219/proxy-access-update-a-review-of-likelihood-costs  
37
 Del Guercio et al. (2008) indicate that a withheld vote of greater than 20% is considered a ―substantial‖ threshold 
to induce governance changes.  The authors note that campaign proponents are typically able to garner vote support 
from their fellow shareholders at this level; however, the average percentage of votes withheld in their sample of 
director elections is only 11.4%.  
38
 Claudia H. Allen, Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg, LLP, November 12, 
2007. 
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A third change occurred with respect to the ability of brokers to vote shares held in their 
brokerage accounts.  Most individual shareholders in the U.S. hold their shares through brokers 
and are not the record holders of those shares (Kahan and Rock 2008). When a company solicits 
proxies, it sends proxy materials to the brokers, which in turn forward them to their customers 
together with a form on which the customers can mark voting instructions.  If the customer does 
not return these instructions, and the issue is designated as routine by the NYSE, the broker can 
vote the instructed shares in its discretion, which usually means in accordance with management 
recommendations. 
Until 2010, NYSE designated all uncontested director elections as routine.
39
  This 
included the election to the Disney board in 2004 and subsequent elections in which active vote 
no campaigns were waged.  This rule has now been changed.  As of January 1, 2010, brokers no 
longer have the right to vote uninstructed shares in director elections.
40
  Thus, such shares are not 
voted at all.  Finally, while proxy access was waxing and waning at the SEC, Delaware law made 
clear that shareholders had broad powers to adopt bylaws governing proxy access.  In 2008, the 
Delaware Supreme Court held in CA Inc. v. AFSCME that provisions facilitating the nomination 
of director candidates by shareholders can be included in bylaws, which can be adopted by 
shareholders without board approval, and need not be included in the certificate of incorporation 
(which can be changed only upon a board recommendation) (Kahan and Rock 2003).  The 
following year, the Delaware legislature adopted a new provision that explicitly allowed proxy 
access to be adopted via bylaw.
41
  Under Delaware law Section 112, the bylaws may provide that 
                                                 
39
 NYSE, Inc., Rule 452 (March 6, 2003). Since NYSE exchange rules effectively govern all brokers, this rule 
applies to all publicly traded companies, regardless of where their stock is listed for trading. 
40
 Julie Connelly, What the Amended Rule 452 Means to You, Corporate Board Member, 3
rd
 Quarter 2009. 
41
 House Bill No. 19, Delaware House of Representatives, 145
th
 General Assembly, (effective August 1, 
2009); See also Delaware Bar Association comment letter on proxy access, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-65.pdf.  
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individuals nominated by a stockholder will be included in the corporation‘s proxy solicitation 
materials, and included in any form of proxy it distributes, with such procedures or conditions it 
chooses.  These conditions include, but are not limited to, a minimum level or duration of 
ownership, submission of specified information, and limitations on parties seeking control.  In 
principle, therefore, if a majority of shareholders of a company want proxy access, they have the 
power to adopt a proxy access bylaw, at least in most Delaware-chartered companies.
42
   
Unlike the SEC‘s proxy access rule, Section 112 is consistent with, and will appeal to 
fans of, an enabling approach to corporate governance, as it permits each company to determine 
for itself whether to have proxy access, and to tailor the terms, including which shareholders 
should be eligible to make nominations, rather than impose the same ―one size fits all‖ approach 
on all companies.   
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
3.1. Sample Construction 
The initial sample is an unbalanced balance of director-level data for Standard & Poor‘s 
(S&P) 500, S&P MidCaps, and S&P SmallCap firms collected by RiskMetrics for the period 
1996 through 2009.  The data are based on the former Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) annual publications of ―Board Practices/Board Pay:  The Structure and Compensation of 
                                                 
42
 Though Section 112 became effective in August 2009, there is no shareholder proposal during the 2010 proxy 
season that tried to use Section 112 to opt into a homemade proxy access rule. While this may indicate a lack of 
demand, it could also be due to the fact that shareholders rights advocates were awaiting the likely adoption of the 
SEC proxy access rule. Moreover, without changes in federal law, a proxy access rule under Section 112 would have 
created some tensions with the antifraud provision in the proxy rules. Specifically, to the extent the company‘s 
proxy statement includes information provided by a nominating shareholder, and that information is materially false 
or misleading, the company would have violated Rule 14a-9. The new federal proxy access rule makes it a violation 
for a nominating shareholder to cause a company to include materially false or misleading information regarding a 
proxy access nomination under federal or state law (see Rule 14a-9(c)) and exculpates the company form any 
liability for false or misleading statements supplied by a nominating shareholder in Schedule 14N or otherwise (Rule 
14a-11(f)). It is not entirely clear whether this exculpation applies to information furnished under Section 112. 
However, prior to the adoption of the federal proxy access rule, the clear lack of any exculpation would have made 
company wary of adopting proxy access under Section 112. 
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Boards of Directors at S&P 1,500 Companies.‖  The publications contain information on 
directors from company DEF14A proxy statements or annual reports, such as the race, age, and 
tenure, and affiliation of the director, the number of other corporate directorships each director 
holds, the ownership voting power of each director, and the committee memberships of the 
director.  The database also contains a variable denoting whether a director is designated.  Under 
the RiskMetrics classification, a designated director is ―a designee under a documented 
agreement by a group, such as a union or significant shareholder.‖  Furthermore, in the database, 
majority holders, or employees of majority holders, are assumed to be designated.   
To obtain firm-level governance data, the RiskMetrics directors-level data is merged with 
the RiskMetrics firm-level governance data (formerly the IRRC governance database), which has 
information on board characteristics such as board size, percentage independent and insider 
directors, the presence of classified boards and poison pills, as well as other takeover defenses.  
The database is based on the periodic print publication of the RiskMetrics, ―Corporate Takeover 
Defenses,‖ which covers approximately 2,000 corporations and compiles a wide array of 
corporate governance provisions from public sources such as SEC form 10-Ks, SEC form 10-Qs, 
annual proxy statements, and corporate bylaws and charters.  It includes data from nine 
published volumes: September, 1990; July, 1993; July, 1995; February, 1998; November, 1999; 
February, 2002; 2004; 2006; and 2009.    
To obtain financial data, such as market value of equity, stock price, abnormal returns, 
firm size, return on assets, total assets, sales growth, free cash flow, and standard industrial 
classification (SIC) codes, the RiskMetrics data is merged with Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) and Compustat.  The final sample of complete director- and firm-level data 
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consists of 207,309 directorships (director firm-years) in 21,758 firm-years of data on 1,803 
firms. 
 
3.2. Designated Directors: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports a total of 3,908 designated directorships (designated director 
firm-years) in 1,610 firm-years (for 1996 through 2009) on 344 unique designated firms.
43
  The 
directors are coded as designated or non-designated at the time of the annual meeting, as noted 
on the firm‘s SEC Form DEF14A annual proxy statement.  Designated directors are appointed 
by the firm, and thus are neither nominated by nor voted upon by shareholders, whereas non-
designated directors follow normal election procedures—i.e. they are nominated by the board 
and then voted upon by shareholders.  Designated directors comprise a total of 1.89 percent of 
the total 207,309 directorships (director firm-years) in the RiskMetrics database.  
Table 2 presents the RiskMetrics data by industry on both the firm-level and director-
level.  The full firm-level sample includes firms that have at least one designated director on its 
board (hereafter referred to as designated firms), plus firms that do not have any designated 
directors present on the board (non-designated firms).  The full director-level sample includes 
both designated directors and non-designated directors.  The industry analysis was done utilizing 
the Fama and French (1997) 12-industry classification from Professor Kenneth French‘s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
44
  The distribution of 
                                                 
43
 Although this is arguably a small sample size (percent not magnitude) relative to the entire database of directors, 
designated directors have similar incidence ratios to those used in the fraud literature.  For example, Agrawal, Jaffe, 
and Karpoff (1999) identify 103 fraud firms between 1978 – 1992, Karpoff and Lott (1993) identify 132 fraud 
events at 71 firms for a nine year period from 1978 – 1987, and Alexander, Arlen and Cohen (1999) examine 243 
sentences of public firms between 1988 and 1996.  Furthermore, within the board composition literature there are 
studies which use comparably small sample sizes as well.  For example Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) examine 170 
inside director announcements between 1981 and 1985. 
44
 Finer classifications, such as Fama and French (1997) 49-industry classification, result in partitions with many 
industries having only one or two firms in the sample.  Since many of the board characteristics variables (e.g., 
 20 
 
firms across industries varies between designated firms and non-designated firms.  Table 2 
illustrates that there are more designated firms in the consumer nondurable, telecommunication, 
and financial industries, and less designated firms in manufacturing, business equipment, 
utilities, and wholesale/retail industries.  Within the designated firm sample, the largest 
percentage of designated firms (17.91 percent) is in the financial industry.
45
  Adams and Mehran 
(2003) indicate that one result of proxy fights in the financial industry is an increase in board 
size, whereby the acquirer board merges with the target‘s board.   
Table 2 examines the industry breakdown of designated directors versus non-designated 
directors.  The results hold for the director-level as with the firm-level, with the largest 
percentage of designated directors (19.61 percent) categorized in the financial industry.  The 
largest disparity between designated and non-designated directors is in regard to the 
telecommunications industry, where only 2.00 percent of non-designated directors versus 12.62 
percent of designated directors are categorized in this industry, a notable 10.62 percent 
difference between samples.  Yermack (2004) suggests excluding firms in the financial and 
electric utility industries, since these industries have larger boards dominated by local business 
executives.  Adams and Mehran (2003) note that the financial industry, since it is regulated, is 
different than unregulated industries, such as manufacturing firms.  In this dissertation, all future 
analyses will be done including all industries, and then with all non-financial industry segments. 
Table 3 presents the RiskMetrics data on both the firm-level and director-level.  The full 
firm-level sample includes designated and non-designated firms.  The full director-level sample 
                                                                                                                                                             
classified board, poison pill) are highly persistent over time, using industry dummies based on finer industry 
classifications would be tantamount to including firm-specific dummies. 
45
 In examining the data to find why the largest representation of designated directors is in the financial industry, 
given the low number of proxy fights, the designated director‘s affiliation is explored.  For financial firms: 25 
designated directors are former employees, 12 are relatives, 81 result from a business transaction, and 62 from 
professional services. 
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includes both designated directors and non-designated directors.  Each of the samples is then 
further segregated based on the director‘s tenure on the board.  The tenure of directors on the 
board is measured at the time of the annual meeting [see Equation (1) below]. 
YEARBEGYEARENDTENURE                         (1) 
where YEAREND = the date that service of the director on the board ends 
 YEARBEG = the date that service of the director on the board begins 
 
Yermack (2004) notes that a large number of directors join their boards by appointment 
rather than shareholder election midway through the year.  Thus, a director is classified as a new 
director if his or her tenure is equal to or less than one year (ensuring that all initial 
appointments, including mid-year appointments, will be included).  A director is classified as 
continuing if his or her tenure is greater than one year.  
If the director is a designated director, then the annual meeting is the first time 
shareholders become aware of the designated director‘s appointment.  The firm is not required to 
disclose the designated director prior to the annual meeting, since shareholders are not voting on 
that director.  It takes time for shareholders to gain knowledge of the designated director, and his 
or her purpose for being appointed to the board.  The new director variable captures the 
director‘s inaugural year on the board of directors, after shareholders are made aware of that 
director‘s appointment.  This variable will accurately represent shareholders initial reaction to 
the appointment of the director, as well as identify what firm-year data should be the basis (t=0) 
for analyses.   
For a designated continuing director, this would indicate that the director has been 
reappointed on a year-to-year basis.  The terms of the appointment of the designated director are 
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usually made after their initial appointment to the board, and vary depending on the situation.  It 
can be as little as a one-year contract or an indefinite term, subject to ownership positions being 
maintained by the designated director.  The director-level data are uniquely categorized into 
these two tenure categories, new directors versus continuing directors, while the firm-level data 
are not mutually exclusively based on such categories.  Firms with at least one new designated 
director will be subsequently referred to as new designated firms, while firms with at least one 
continuing designated director on the board will be referred to as continuing designated firms. 
Table 3 shows that for 1996 through 2009, there are 1,253 new designated directors who 
have been on the board for less than or equal to one year, and 2,655 continuing designated 
directors who have served on the board for more than one year.  The table records that for 1996 
through 2009, there are 668 firms with at least one new designated director, and 990 firms with 
at least one continuing designated director. 
 
3.3. Entrenchment and Governance Summary Statistics 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) coded the data from these RiskMetrics ―Corporate 
Takeover Defenses‖ volumes and built a governance index, or G-index, based on 24 governance 
anti-takeover provisions.  One point is added for each governance provision that reduces 
shareholder rights, since anti-takeover amendments protect managers from the discipline of the 
takeover market while potentially harming shareholders.  Thus, higher G-index numbers indicate 
less shareholder-friendly provisions in place or worse overall governance.  Gompers et al. (2003) 
find evidence that firms with weak shareholder rights (i.e. high G-indexes) are less profitable, 
have lower sales growth, higher capital expenditures, and make more corporate acquisitions.  
The authors further conclude that increases in the G-index are associated with decreases in 
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Tobin‘s Q (Gompers et al. 2003), indicating a negative correlation between the two variables.  
Tobin‘s Q is the ratio of a firm‘s market value to the replacement cost of its assets and is 
conventionally interpreted to proxy for a firm‘s investment or growth opportunities. 
Panel A of Table 4 compares the G-index for years 1998 through 2009, which indicates 
that designated firms have a lower average G-index of 8.83 versus non-designated firms with an 
average G-index of 9.23.  The lower G-index indicates that these designated firms have, on 
average, stronger shareholder rights provisions in place than non-designated firms.   
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) propose a sub-index of the G-index based on six 
provisions from the RiskMetrics governance database, called the entrenchment index, or E-
index.  Bebchuk et al. (2009) found that the six sub-index provisions fully drove the correlation 
between governance provisions and firm performance as previously identified by Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003).  Panel C of Table 4 examines the correlation between the E-index and G-
index for designated firms (firms with at least one designated director on the board), and reports 
a correlation coefficient of 0.71, which is lower than the correlation coefficient of 0.74 as 
reported in Bebchuk et al. (2009), but higher than that for firms with no designated directors on 
its board (0.58), as well as higher than the full sample of all firms (0.60).
46
 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) categorize the following as ―constitutional‖ 
provisions which prevent a majority of shareholders from having their way: classified boards, 
limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, and supermajority requirements for mergers and for 
charter amendments.  The authors categorize poison pills and golden parachutes as ―takeover 
readiness‖ provisions, since boards put these provisions in place in order to be ready for a hostile 
takeover.  The entrenchment index, hereafter referred to as the E-index, assigns one company 
                                                 
46
 However, Bebchuk et al. (2009) only report the correlation coefficient for 1990 – 2002 as 0.74.  When the 
correlation coefficient for the full sample of firms is calculated for 1998 – 2009, it is 0.5961, considerably lower 
than 0.74.    
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one point for each of the six provisions in the index that the firm has [see Equation (2) below].  
Thus, each firm in each year will have an E-index score between 0 and 6, where higher index 
scores (such as 5 or 6) indicate more entrenched firms. 
PPILLSUPERMAJOR                          
LACHTRLABYLWGPARACHUTECBOARDEINDEX


    (2) 
where:  
CBOARD = 1 if firm has a classified board, 0 otherwise  
GPARACHUTE = 1 if the firm has golden parachute agreements, 0 otherwise 
LABYLW = 1 if the firm has limits to amend bylaws, 0 otherwise 
LACHTR = 1 if the firm has limits to amend charter, 0 otherwise 
SUPERMAJOR = 1 if the firm has supermajority requirements to approve mergers, 0 otherwise 
PPILL = 1 if the firm has a poison pill in place, 0 otherwise 
 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) find a negative correlation between Tobin‘s Q and 
the E-index, as well as a negative correlation between the level of the E-index and risk-adjusted 
returns during the period 1992 through 2003.   
Designated firms have a lower mean E-index than non-designated firms, as reported in 
Panel B of Table 4.  This is to be expected, given the high correlation between the G-index and 
E-index for designated firms and that Panel A showed that designated firms likewise had a lower 
mean G-index.  The average E-index for years 1998 through 2009 for designated firms is 2.54, 
versus 2.73 for non-designated firms.  This indicates that designated firms, on average, are also 
less entrenched than non-designated firms.   
Panels D and E of Table 4 document the mean G-index and mean E-index (respectively) 
for firms with at least one new director versus firms with at least one continuing director.  Both 
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the G-index and E-index are comparatively lower for designated firms than non-designated firms 
for both tenure categories, supporting the results from Panels A and B of Table 4, which indicate 
that designated firms have better governance structures and are less entrenched than non-
designated firms.   In Panel A of Table 4, the average overall G-index for all designated firms is 
8.83.  The new designated firm‘s average G-index (8.97) is higher than continuing designated 
firms (8.64).  New designated firms have worse governance structures and are likely to have 
lower Tobin‘s Q and lower risk-adjusted returns than continuing designated firms, but designated 
firms as a whole are better governed than non-designated firms.  Panel E of Table 4 examines the 
E-index in the same context as Panel D of Table 4, and the data lead to the same interpretation.  
The results indicate that after the appointment of a new designated director, within a one year 
time frame there is considerable improvement in the governance structure, and likewise the firms 
are less entrenched.      
 
3.4. Designated Directors: The Basic Facts 
 3.4.1. Firms with designated directors: are they different? 
Table 5 shows descriptive characteristics for selected firm, board, and director 
characteristics.  In this analysis, a market-based measure of performance, Tobin‘s Q, is used, as 
well as an accounting measure, return on assets (ROA).  The proxy for Tobin‘s Q is the ratio of 
the firm‘s market value to its book value.  The firm‘s market value is calculated as the book 
value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity.  ROA is the ratio 
of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations to its book value of assets.   
Table 9 has additional variable definitions.   
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Panel A of Table 5 compares the means of various firm characteristics across firm-years 
in which firms have at least one designated director on the board and firm-years without 
designated directors for the sample of complete data.  The comparison shows that, in years in 
which firms have at least one designated director on their board, firms are smaller, have lower 
performance in terms of ROA and Tobin‘s Q, lower cash-to-assets ratio, but are more highly 
leveraged than non-designated firms.  Thus, designated firms are carrying approximately the 
same cash level as non-designated firms, despite that they are smaller in size.  Designated firms 
have a much higher sales growth (28 percent) than non-designated firms (15 percent).   Given the 
similar cash levels between the two samples, it is important to note that the degree of designated 
firms‘ leverage, lower Tobin‘s Q, and lower ROA contribute to the firms‘ appeal as a target by 
some activist group, majority shareholder, or union for the appointment of a designated director.  
The comparisons in Panel A of Table 5 suggest that firms‘ choices to appoint designated 
directors could be influenced by firm characteristics.  Thus, it is important to control for such 
firm characteristics in the analysis. 
 
 3.4.2. Designated director boards 
Panel A of Table 5 demonstrates that designated firms have larger boards, with an 
average of 11 members versus that of 9 members for non-designated firms.  Since designated 
firms are smaller than non-designated firms, the expectation is that designated firms should have 
smaller boards, comparatively.  However, the board size counts the presence of the designated 
director.  When board size is recalculated at the firm-year level without designated directors, 
there is no statistical difference in the mean of board size between designated firms and non-
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designated firms.
47
  Designated firms have a lower percentage of independent and insider 
directors than non-designated firms (50 percent versus 68 percent, and 19 percent versus 20 
percent, respectively).  This may indicate that because of the lack of independence, the board 
was more susceptible to the appointment of a designated director by a special interest group or 
activist.   
Furthermore, designated firms have a lower incidence of poison pills (43 percent versus 
65 percent) and are less likely to have a classified board than non-designated firms (59 percent 
versus 69 percent).  As aforementioned designated firms have a lower average G-index and E-
index than non-designated firms, indicating they are less entrenched and have higher shareholder 
rights—i.e. are better governed.  The lower G-index and E-index, lower incidences of classified 
boards and poison pills, and higher sales growth for designated firms are all in accordance with 
one another.  However, the results for Tobin‘s Q and ROA between the two sub-samples are 
confounding with Gompers et al. (2003) evidence.  Gompers et al. (2003) predict that low G-
index and E-index firms should have better financial performance, as evidenced by higher 
Tobin‘s Q and higher ROA, while in fact designated firms are worse financial performers. 
 
 3.4.3. Designated directors in the boardroom 
Panel B of Table 5 reports designated directors are an average age of 54, hold less than 
one other public directorship, and are primarily white males with less than one percent having 
interlocking directorships.  Non-designated directors are, on average, older (60), but likewise are 
                                                 
47
 As a robustness check, the average board size is calculated for financial firms with at least one designated director 
(designated financial firm) as 13 versus 11 for non-financial firms with at least one designated director (designated 
non-financial firm), which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  Furthermore, financial firms are omitted 
completely, and then the average board size is recalculated, which for designated firms is 10 versus 9 for non-
designated firms, statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  Adams and Mehran (2008) find that although 
banking firms have larger boards, due to mergers and acquisitions, and these larger bank board sizes do not 
underperform their non-bank peers in terms of Tobin‘s Q.   
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primarily white males with a mere one percent interlocking incidence rate.  Specifically, 
designated directors are less likely to be females and more likely to be minorities than non-
designated directors. Better governed firms are more likely to have minorities and females 
serving on their boards, and likewise such firms perform better financially.  Using a cross-section 
of large U.S. firms with 797 observations, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) find a 
significantly positive relationship between the percentage of women and ethnic minorities on the 
board and firm value.  Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that female directors have a significantly 
positive impact on ―board inputs and firm outcomes.‖  However, the authors only find a 
significantly positive effect on performance for firms whose owners suffered from weak 
governance in the past. 
Designated directors actively serve on board committees: nearly 20 percent of the 
designated directors are nominating committee members, 32 percent are compensation 
committee members, and 24 percent audit committee members.  Nevertheless, non-designated 
directors are committee members on a more frequent basis than designated directors.  A small 
percentage of the designated directors are committee chairs, e.g. five percent of all designated 
directors serve as compensation chairs.  Likewise, non-designated directors are committee chairs 
more frequently than designated directors.   
Designated directors have an average tenure of four years of board service, while non-
designated directors have an average tenure of approximately nine years.  This is due to a limited 
tenure specified in the agreements between the designated directors and the firm‘s management.  
Designated directors have a statistically significant higher incidence of nonattendance as 
compared to non-designated directors.  Nonattendance is tracked and noted by RiskMetrics if the 
director attends less than 75 percent of board and committee meetings.   
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Designated directors have both a higher ownership stake and higher percent control of 
voting power than non-designated directors.  Approximately 41 percent of designated directors 
own more than one percent of voting power, as compared to a mere 14 percent of non-designated 
directors.  Designated directors have an average of six percent control of voting power, as 
compared to a much lower two percent voting power control for non-designated directors.  The 
higher ownership and voting power increases the likelihood of the appointment of the designated 
director on that firm‘s board.  Furthermore, board composition is known to be related to a firm‘s 
ownership structure.  Bhagat and Black (2002) find that firms with high inside ownership have 
less independent boards.  This supports the earlier finding that designated firms have less 
independent boards since they have a higher level of insider ownership by designated directors.   
The primary responsibilities of the corporate board of directors are to engage, monitor, 
and replace (if need be) company management.  Substantial equity ownership by directors 
creates a personally-based incentive for active monitoring.  An integral part of the monitoring 
process is the replacement of the CEO when circumstances warrant.  Companies where the CEO 
is replaced expeditiously in times of poor performance may have more active and effective 
monitoring boards than those companies where ineffective CEOs remain in office for longer 
periods of time.  Bhagat and Black (1999) find that when directors own a greater dollar amount 
of stock, they were more likely to replace the CEO of a company performing poorly.  It stands to 
reason that designated firms are more concerned with monitoring than non-designated firms. 
Panel C of Table 5 documents 4 percent of designated directors are former employees, 
while nearly 21 percent are designated to the board because of a business transaction between the 
director and the firm.  This is significantly higher than the two percent of non-designated 
directors appointed to the board because of a business transaction.  Around two percent of 
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designated directors are relatives of employees of the company on the board on which they sit.  
Nearly ten percent of designated directors offer professional services in some capacity to the 
company, such as legal services.  Cumulatively, 36 percent of designated directors have a prior 
documented affiliation with the board, while only 13 percent of non-designated directors are 
affiliated.  Again, the affiliation is a contributing reason that the designated director was 
appointed to the board. 
Fourteen percent of designated directors are CEOs of other firms (outside CEO-
directors), twelve percent of designated directors serve as the president at another firm, and 
eleven percent chairmen of other firms.  This is statistically significantly lower, on average, than 
for non-designated directors.  Designated directors are more likely to be CFOs of other firms 
than non-designated directors.  Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) examine directors with 
financial expertise.  They find that directors‘ financial expertise do not affect firms‘ CEO 
compensation policies.  Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2009) examine directors who are CEOs of 
other firms (i.e., outside CEO-directors).  Fahlenbrach et al. (2009) find that appointing such 
directors certifies firm quality to the market; other than that, once appointed, these directors have 
no discernable impact on the firm. 
 
 3.4.4. Correlation matrix for selected firm-level governance and financial variables 
Table 6 presents Pearson product-moment correlations among independent variables, as 
described in detail in Table 9, for the entire sample of designated and non-designated firms.  
Board size has a strong positive correlation to the G-index, and on a smaller magnitude is 
positively correlated to classified boards and the E-index.  Tobin‘s Q has a negative correlation 
with board size, and the presence of a classified board and poison pill.  Similar to Gompers et al. 
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(2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) findings, Tobin‘s Q has a negative correlation with both the G-
index and E-index.  Thus, the higher the G-index and E-index (i.e. the worse the governance 
structure and more entrenched the firm is), then the lower the Tobin‘s Q for that firm (worse 
financial performance).  Leverage is also strongly negatively correlated with firm performance, 
as measured by Tobin‘s Q, and positively correlated with sales growth and the G-index and E-
index.  The market value of equity, a proxy of firm size, is positively correlated with the 
industry-adjusted ROA, Tobin‘s Q, and board size, but negatively correlated with classified 
boards, percent independent boards, poison pills, and the G-index and E-index. 
 
4. Shareholder Wealth Effects from Designated Directors 
An event study is used to identify and measure the shareholder wealth effects of the 
initial appointment of a new designated director to a firm, as well as the wealth effects of the 
designated director continuing on the board.  A designated director may be an activist-director 
who agitates for changes in the firm, or a long-term investor-director who works quietly behind 
the scenes.  If shareholders perceive that designated directors do not serve their interests, then 
companies would experience negative stock price reactions around the firm‘s annual meeting; 
while the opposite is true if shareholders expect net benefits from the presence of designated 
directors.  A positive stock price reaction to designated directors would also indicate that 
shareholders perceive designated director (and designated firms) as good monitors. 
 
4.1. Event Study Methodology and Test Statistics 
Measuring the stock price reaction to the appointment of a new designated director will 
capture the market‘s ex-ante assessment of the net impact of adding a designated director to a 
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firm‘s board, as well as the net impact of having a designated director continue board service.  A 
standard event study using the annual meeting date as event date 0 is estimated using the market 
model parameters over the 255-day period ending 46 days prior to the announcement (i.e. annual 
meeting date).
48
  The annual meeting date is an appropriate event date, since firms do not 
disclose the designated director‘s appointment until that date because these directors are not 
being voted on by shareholders.
49
  Karpoff and Malatesta (1995) note that if all of the firms in 
the sample are small, an event study using the market model may produce biased estimates of the 
sample firms‘ abnormal returns.  As depicted in Panel A of Table 5, designated firms are smaller 
than non-designated firms, and thus the cumulative abnormal return estimates from the event 
studies may be biased.  Table 7 records mean and median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
over the 2-day announcement period [0,+1], as well as the percentage of positive CARs.   
 Evidence in the finance literature suggests that stock returns in the announcement period 
are typically more volatile than those in the estimation period (Kothari and Warner 1997, Barber 
and Lyon 1997, and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 1999).  Brown and Warner (1985) have suggested 
the use of cross-sectional test statistics when there is an increase in return variance during the 
announcement period.  The standard error of the announcement period returns for the sample 
firms is used as an estimate of the standard error of the mean cumulative abnormal return 
(CARs).   
                                                 
48
As a robustness check, all the event studies are  run using the market adjusted model, and the results hold.  Both 
the CRSP value weighted and CRSP equally weighted indices are used as benchmarks.  Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) suggest a market model with a 150-trading day estimation window [-170,-21], and CRSP equally weighted 
index as the market index, with a two day trading interval of [-1,0].  Using similar parameters, the results remain the 
same. 
49
 For future research, the proxy mailing date will be used, which is available via the Corporate Library database, to 
see if the results are robust.  Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) note that new director announcements are sometimes, but 
not always, made in the Wall Street Journal first, which precede the proxy mailing date by several days.  However, 
in no case did the Wall Street Journal announcement appear during the period between the proxy mailing date and 
the annual meeting, which is typically one month. 
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Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) propose that the variance of mean abnormal 
returns is estimated from the cross-section of the event date (instead of the estimation period) 
prediction errors.  This requires the assumption that the event date variance is proportional to the 
estimated period variance and is similar across securities.  This statistic is well specified even 
when there are no changes in variance; if that is the case the test is less powerful.  The Boehmer 
et al. (1991) standardized cross-sectional test is properly specified for upper tailed tests.  For 
lower tailed alternative hypotheses, the parametric test rejects too often; a non-parametric test, 
like the generalized sign test described below, is more powerful in that circumstance.   
Previous studies have shown that abnormal returns distributions show fat tails and are 
right-skewed (Kothari and Warner 1997, Barber and Lyon 1997, and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
1999).  Parametric tests reject too often when testing for positive abnormal performance, and too 
seldom when testing for negative abnormal performance.  When the assumption of normality of 
abnormal returns is violated, parametric tests are not well specified.  This is when non-
parametric tests are well-specified and more powerful at detecting a false null hypothesis of no 
abnormal returns. 
Non-parametric tests, such as the generalized sign test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test, are 
also conducted on the announcement period returns; the usual null hypothesis is that the median 
announcement period return is zero.  The generalized sign test is a simple binomial test of 
whether the frequency of positive abnormal residuals is different from 50 percent.  The 
advantage is that it takes into account the skewness in security returns.  The Wilcoxon signed-
rank test considers that both the sign and the magnitude of abnormal returns are important. 
Thus, in Table 7, the generalized sign test employed by Cowan (1992) is used to test the 
percentage of positive CARs, while the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to test for differences 
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in the median CARs, in addition to Boehmer et al. (1991) cross-sectional and Patell (1976) 
statistics to test for differences in the mean CARs.  All statistical tests significances are noted in 
the tables at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels (see descriptive table headings 
for significance notation for the various tests). 
Brown and Warner (1985) and MacKinlay (1997) show that the power of the event study 
technique improves as the number of firms in the sample increase, as the number of days in the 
announcement window decreases, and as the alternative of a larger abnormal return is considered 
against the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return.  In Table 7 the 2-day announcement period 
[0,+1] is tested across many sub-samples as the event window.
50
 
 
  4.2. Shareholder Wealth Effects from Designated Directors 
Hypothesis 1:  The shareholder wealth effects for firms announcing the presence of at 
least one designated director on the board are negative. 
Panel A of Table 7 presents mean and median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  
Model (1) studies the full sample of directors, for both designated firms and non-designated 
firms.  Results show that boards without at least one designated director (non-designated firms) 
have a strong significant positive stock price reaction around the day of the annual meeting.  The 
CAR for non-designated firms is +0.19 percent for the two-day event window [0,+1].  The 
median CAR for designated firms is weakly statistically significant with a -0.24 percent versus 
+0.08 percent for non-designated firms.  This is evidence that shareholders perceive firms with at 
least one designated director present on the board (designated firm) as a hindrance to the 
interests of all shareholders and contrary to what is best for the firm overall.  
                                                 
50
 As a robustness check, other short-horizon event windows, such as [-1,0], [0,+2], [0,+10], [0,+30] are considered, 
including the three-day window suggested by Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990): [-1,+1].  The only consistent 
statistically significant window is the two-day one presented in Table 6: [0,+1]. 
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Hypothesis 2:  The shareholder wealth effects for firms announcing the appointment of a 
new designated director on the board are negative. 
Hypothesis 3:  The shareholder wealth effects for firms announcing a designated 
director continuing on the board are negative. 
Panel B of Table 7 studies the full sample of directors, including both designated firms 
and non-designated firms, around the two tenure windows.  Model (2) tests the first sub-sample, 
which is the initial appointment of the new designated director to the board (tenure less than or 
equal to one year), while Model (3) tests the continuing designated directors on the board (tenure 
greater than one year).  The appointment date is the annual meeting date, as identified from each 
company‘s DEF14A proxy statement, which also serves as the event date.   
The results are slightly stronger for the new director tenure sub-sample (Model 2) than 
the continuing director sub-sample (Model 3), and likewise support Hypothesis 2.  For Model 2, 
if a firm announces at least one new director (that is not designated) elected to the board, there is 
a positive CAR of +0.17 percent, whereas if the firm announces at least one new designated 
director appointed to the board, the mean CAR is -0.42 percent.  For a random sample of 500 
firms, Brickley (1986) found abnormal returns of +0.56 percent over the two-day period [0,+1], 
including the annual meeting date and following trading day.  If there are positive abnormal 
returns for the sample using the same two-day window around the annual meeting date, this 
would indicate that the wealth effects are attributed to the firm‘s other announcements made at 
the annual meeting, such as earnings and dividends.  Thus, the negative CAR for the 
announcement of a new designated director appointed to the board is a strong result, since a 
priori one expects an average positive CAR of +0.56 percent.  While shareholders perceive new 
non-designated directors being elected to the board at firms as value-enhancing, shareholders 
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react negatively to the announcement of the appointment of a new designated director.  This 
indicates that shareholders do not perceive new designated directors as good monitors or likely to 
increase firm performance.   
 
Hypothesis 4:  The shareholder wealth effects for firms announcing the presence of a 
designated director on the board are different for firms with weaker governance 
structures (as measured by a higher E-index and G-index). 
Panel C of Table 7 has sub-samples formed on each entrenchment proxy and governance 
proxy, as well as industry classification, for just designated firms.  Low-G (Low-E) firms have 
G-indexes (E- indexes) that are less than the full sample median G-index (E-index) for that firm-
year, while High-G (High-E) companies have G- indexes (E- indexes) that are greater than or 
equal to the median for that firm-year (Akyol, Lim, and Verwijmeren 2009).
51
  In Model 4 the 
analysis is focused solely on designated firms, and the difference in CARs between Low-G and 
High-G firms.   
The announcement of the presence of a designated director at worse governed firms (as 
measured at the time of the annual meeting) have a positive average CAR of +0.83 percent, 
while the announcement of the presence of a designated director at better governed firms have a 
negative average CAR of -0.25 percent, and the difference is statistically significant at the one 
percent level.   
In Model 5 the same results are found, which is that more entrenched firms have a higher, 
and statistically positive, mean CAR of +0.69 percent versus that of less entrenched firms (with a 
mean CAR of -0.24 percent).  Models 4 and 5 indicate that when it is announced that a 
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 Akyol, Lim, and Verwijmeren (2009) also divide their sample into groups of low, medium, and high for the E-
index as a robustness check.  Specifically, the sub-samples were low-E (E-index of 0 to 1), medium-E (E-index of 2 
to 3), and high-E (E-index of 4 to 5).  Their results hold even when tested among each of these sub-samples. 
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designated director is present on the board of a better governed firm, that shareholders react 
negatively, suggesting that they have believe that the designated director will not act in the best 
interest of all shareholders or be good monitors.  This also indicates that other shareholders 
would like to maintain the good governance structure that is already in place.  Likewise, both 
models also indicate that when it is announced that a designated director is present on the board 
of a worse governed firm that shareholders react positively, suggesting that shareholders are 
ready for a change, and thus welcome the presence of the designated director with the hopes that 
said director will be a good monitor.  In Models 7 through 10, the designated director sub-sample 
is examined further to see if the tenure of the designated director, i.e. whether the director is new 
or continuing, makes a difference. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  The shareholder wealth effects for firms announcing the presence of a 
designated director on the board are different for firms in the financial industry than 
firms in all other industries. 
Model 6 in Panel C of Table 7 tests the difference between the average CARs between 
non-financial and financial firms, and finds no statistical differences.  Typically financial firms 
have very different structures than non-financial firms, such as corporate governance structures 
and degree of leverage, and are often excluded on that basis (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  Gillan , 
Hartzell, and Starks (2003) indicate that corporate governance characteristics of firms vary 
significantly across industries.  For example, financial and utility companies typically have very 
large boards that are drawn from specific constituencies, such as major customers and local 
business leaders (Shivdasani and Yermack 1999).
52
  Barber and Lyon (1997) examine the impact 
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 Barber and Lyon (1997) examine the impact of excluding the financial firms from the previous studies by 
comparing the statistical characteristics of the returns from the financial firms and the non-financial firms used in the 
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of excluding the financial firms by comparing the statistical characteristics of the returns from 
the financial firms and the non-financial firms.  They find that both sets of returns are very 
similar, and therefore suggest that the impact of this exclusion is minimal.  Thus, since there is 
no statistical difference between the average CARs of non-financial and financial firms, 
subsequently the financial firms are included as part of the sample for multivariate analysis. 
 
Hypothesis 6:  The shareholder wealth effects for firms announcing the appointment of a 
new designated director on the board are positive for firms with weaker governance 
structures (as measured by a higher E-index and G-index). 
Hypothesis 7:  The shareholder wealth effects for firms announcing a designated 
director continuing on the board are positive for firms with weaker governance 
structures (as measured by a higher E-index and G-index). 
In Panels D and E of Table 7, the analyses focus on the new versus continuing designated 
directors.  In general, the results paint the same picture for both the G-index and E-index sub-
samples.  For continuing designated directors, there is no statistical difference between worse 
governed and better governed firms or more entrenched versus less entrenched boards.  Better 
governed firms (Low-G) have negative average CARs for the announcement of new designated 
directors, which mean that shareholders view these directors will be poor monitors.  Worse 
governed firms (High-G) have a statistically positive CAR, indicating that shareholders perceive 
the addition of these designated directors as beneficial to all shareholders (i.e. good monitors).  
Less entrenched firms have a statistically negative CAR when it is announced that a new 
designated director is appointed to the board, again indicating that shareholders react negatively 
                                                                                                                                                             
original study. They find that both sets of returns are very similar, and therefore suggest that the impact of this 
exclusion is minimal.  Thus, financial firms are left as part of the sample. 
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to the announcement because the director in question is seemingly acting in his or her own best 
interest at the detriment to other shareholders, or is a threat to the current positive governance 
structure and firm performance.  More entrenched firms, typically classified as worse governed 
firms, yield a positive CAR when it is announced that a new designated director is appointed to 
the board.  In this scenario, shareholders welcome the change, and think that the director will 
have a positive impact on the firm‘s future performance, and thus will be a good monitor acting 
in the best interest of all shareholders.  The event study analysis supports both Hypotheses 6 and 
7, which state that the shareholder wealth effects for both firms announcing the appointment of a 
new designated director on the board, and for firms announcing a continuing designated director 
on the board, are positive for firms with weaker governance structures. 
 
5. Logistic Regression Analyses 
Since designated directors have not been previously examined in the literature, there are 
many interesting research questions to be examined in relation to these directors.  Specifically 
variables which explain the presence of a designated director on a firm‘s board are examined.  
Considering there are a multitude of potential explanatory variables, the focus is only on those 
which prior literature suggests a relationship would most likely exist.  Other explanatory 
variables and related research questions as an avenue for future research are discussed in Section 
6.   
 
5.1. Research Design 
The design in Table 8 includes a standard logit regression analysis.  Logit regression is 
used for two reasons.  First, the dependent variable—whether a firm has at least one designated 
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director on its board—is a binary variable.  Maddala (1991) argues that logit regression analysis 
is the most suitable statistical method to employ where there is disproportionate sampling from 
two populations, as is the case with this study.  In particular, he asserts that the coefficients of the 
independent variables are not affected by the unequal sampling rates from the two groups.  
Rather, it is only the constant term that is affected (Maddala 1991). 
The models in Table 8 estimate a logit model using firm-level data in which the 
dependent variable is equal to one for designated firms at the time of the annual meeting, and 
zero otherwise.  Table 8 includes a set of board governance and firm characteristics related to the 
presence of designated directors on boards.  For each of the models, column A in Table 8 reports 
the coefficient for the logit models, while column B reports the marginal effects of the 
independent variables, evaluated at the means of the data.  Column A assesses the statistical 
significance of the independent variables, while column B assesses whether the independent 
variable‘s effects are also economically significant.   
Since results can be driven by omitted unobserved firm characteristics, as a robustness 
check all the logit models in Table 8 are recalculated with industry fixed effects.  Fixed effects 
regression exploits within-group variation, such as within-industries, over time.  By including 
industry fixed effects, the average differences across industries is controlled for any observable 
or unobservable predictors, such as board size, market value of equity, governance structure, and 
Tobin‘s Q, thereby reducing omitted variable bias.  The utility and financial industries all are 
statistically significant in all the specifications, indicating that if a firm is in one of these 
industries, it is less likely to have a designated director present on the board, newly appointed to 
the board, or continuing on the board.  However, since none of the signs of the coefficients on 
the remaining independent variables change with industry fixed effects, omitted firm variables 
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do not appear to be an important source of endogeneity.  Thus, the results for all the other 
independent variables are robust to the inclusion of industry fixed effects. 
 
5.2. Independent Variables 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) point out that when boards get beyond seven 
or eight people, they are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control.  
Houlthausen and Larcker (1993) fail to find consistent evidence of an association between board 
size and company performance.  Yermack (1996) presents evidence consistent with the theories 
that small boards of directors are more effective by using Tobin‘s Q as an approximation of 
market valuation.  Yermack (1996) finds an inverse association between board size and firm 
value in sample of 452 large industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991.  Since designated 
firms have been shown to be associated with lower Tobin‘s Q than non-designated firms, and are 
likewise shown to have larger boards, then it is posited that the larger the board size, the more 
likely the firm will have at least one designated director present.   
High board independence has long been considered a function of a well-governed firm.  
Thus, the higher the percentage of independent directors, the less likely the firm will have a 
designated director on its board.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) report that the proportion of 
independent directors on large firm boards increases slightly when a company has performed 
poorly.  Bhagat and Black (2002) find a reasonably strong correlation between poor performance 
and subsequent increase in board independence.  The change in board independence seems to be 
driven by poor performance rather than by firm and industry growth opportunities.  However, 
there is no evidence that greater board independence leads to increased firm performance.      
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Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find that the proportion of outsiders on the board has a 
negative effect on performance; the other governance devices are not significant. They conclude 
that, apart from board composition, control mechanisms are chosen optimally by firms.  
Increasing board independence does not result in improved performance.   
Poison pills are considered to be the most powerful defense against hostile bids and thus 
the defense most likely to affect adversely shareholders‘ interest, although a study by Danielson 
and Karpoff (2006) finds, surprisingly, that firms‘ operating performance improves after a pill‘s 
adoption.  Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994) find that the average stock-market reaction to 
announcements of poison pills is positive when board has a majority of outside directors and 
negative when it does not.  In this study, the presence of either a poison pill or classified board 
would be more likely in a firm with a designated director.  
Bebchuk et al. (2009) report that the correlation between the G-index and E-index is high, 
and as noted previously the relationship holds in this sample.  Thus, the E-index is used as the 
priimary measure of the governance structure of a firm.
53
  It is assumed that worse governed 
firms (i.e. more entrenched) are more likely to have a designated director on board, as the 
defenses to outside special interest groups are greatly reduced and thus those firms are more 
likely to be targets.   
 
5.3. The Likelihood of a Designated Director On a Board 
Model (1) in Table 8 examines the firm and board characteristics that lead to the presence 
of a designated director on a firm‘s board.  The larger the firm and the higher the industry-
adjusted ROA, the less likely that the firm will have a designated director on its board.  
Likewise, the more leveraged a firm, the more likely that it will be a designated firm.  As the 
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 As a robustness check, the G-index is used in all the models instead of the E-index, and the results are similar. 
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board size increases, the more likely that it will be a designated firm, and the higher the 
percentage of the board is independent, the less likely it will be a designated firm.  If a firm has a 
classified board, it is 1.0 percent less likely to be a designated firm, and if the firm has a poison 
pill, then it is 1.9 percent less likely to be a designated firm.  The more entrenched a firm is, as 
measured by the entrenchment index, the more likely it is to be a designated firm.   
Model (2) in Table 8 examines the firm characteristics that lead to the presence of at least 
one designated director that is newly appointed on the firm‘s board.  As a firm‘s industry 
adjusted ROA increases, it is less likely that the firm will have a new designated director.  The 
more leveraged the firm, and the higher the percentage sales growth, the more likely the firm will 
have a designated director appointed to the board the following year.  The bigger the board, and 
the less independent the board, the more likely it will be a new designated firm.   
Model (3) in Table 8 examines the firm characteristics that lead to a designated director 
continuing on a firm‘s board.  As a firm gets bigger in size and less leveraged, then the less 
likely it is to have a continuing designated director on its board.  As the board size increases, and 
the percentage of independent directors decreases, the more likely it will have a continuing 
designated director.  If a firm has a classified board, it is 1.5 percent less likely to be a continuing 
designated firm, or likewise if it has a poison pill present, then it is 2.1 percent less likely to be a 
continuing designated firm.  The more entrenched a firm is, as measured by the E-index, the 
more likely it is to be a continuing designated firm. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Designated firms have lower G-indexes and E-indexes, indicating that these firms on 
average have stronger shareholder rights provisions in place and are less entrenched, and thus are 
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better governed firms.  Designated firms are smaller in size, lower ROA, lower Tobin‘s Q, and 
are more highly leveraged than non-designated firms.  Designated firms have smaller boards and 
are less independent, and less likely to have poison pills and classified boards. 
Designated directors are typically white males who actively serve on board committees 
during their board tenures.  Designated directors have a higher incidence of nonattendance, but 
have a notably higher ownership stake and higher percent control of voting power.  
Approximately 36 percent of designated directors in the sample have a prior documented 
affiliation with the board, the primary reasons are business transactions or professional services.  
Fourteen percent of designated directors in the sample are CEOs of other firms (outside CEO-
directors), twelve percent of designated directors serve as the president at another firm, and 
eleven percent chairmen of other firms. 
Event study results indicate negative [positive] wealth effects to shareholders when a 
newly appointed designated director is appointed to a better- [worse-] governed firm.  Less 
entrenched firms are typically more profitable firms with higher sales growths.  Adding a 
designated director in this scenario would be met with resistance and skepticism by other 
shareholders, as they would perceive designated directors motivation to be one of self-interest.  
Worse governed firms have lower profits and lower sales growths.  When a designated director is 
added in this case, shareholders view the appointment as a chance for better monitoring that will 
hopefully lead to steady long-term profits. 
Logit regression results indicate that the bigger the firm, the higher the percentage of 
independent directors, and the higher the firm‘s industry-adjusted ROA, the less likely the firm is 
to have a designated director on its board.  The more leveraged a firm, and the worse-governed 
that firm, the more likely a firm is to have a designated director present.  This would indicate that 
 45 
 
worse-governed firms are in a questionable financial position, and are more likely to be in a 
position that would lead to the appointment of such designated directors.  
 
6.1. Areas for Future Research 
The event study model can be reexamined following Rosenstein and Wyatt‘s (1990) 
specification of an event date for director elections.  The authors suggest using the earlier of the 
proxy mailing date or announcement in the Wall Street Journal as the announcement event date, 
since new director announcements are sometimes, but not always, made in the Wall Street 
Journal first, which precede the proxy mailing date by several days.
54
  This data would need to 
be hand collected for the initial appointment of all the designated directors in the sample.  In 
using the earliest announcement date instead of the meeting date, the magnitude of the 
cumulative abnormal returns around the event date can be meaningfully obtained and interpreted. 
The preliminary results from this dissertation suggest variations in corporate governance 
across various industries relating to the appointment of designated directors.  Because of the 
large number of designated directors prevalent in the financial industry, focusing solely on the 
designated firms and designated directors appointed within the financial industry is a fruitful area 
for future research.   
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 Rosenstein et al. (1990) suggest a market model with a 150-trading day estimation window [-170,-21], and CRSP 
equally weighted index as the market index, with a two day trading interval of [-1,0]. 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
The table depicts the data in the RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) database for all directors (designated and non-
designated) and the sub-sample of designated directors for the years 1996 – 2009.  Firm-level governance data are 
obtained from the legacy IRRC database (gset) and current governance data from the RiskMetrics database 
(rmgovernance).  Director-level data are obtained from the legacy IRRC database (directors) and current director 
data from the RiskMetrics database (rmdirectors).  The table shows the total number of firms per year, as well as the 
total number of directors per year in the RiskMetrics database.  Then the number of unique firms who have at least 
one designated director is calculated for firm-years, followed by the number of unique designated directors for 
director-firm-years.  Lastly, the percent of designated directors of all directors on a director-firm-year basis is 
shown, which is calculated by dividing the number of unique designated directors divided by the total number of 
directors, on a director-firm-year basis.  
 
 
Year 
All Firms Designated Firms All Directors Designated Directors 
N N N N % 
1996 1,444 102 14,879 258 1.73 
1997 1,584 113 15,630 247 1.58 
1998 1,770 226 17,047 576 3.38 
1999 1,803 217 17,427 576 3.31 
2000 1,755 201 16,675 577 3.46 
2001 1,797 184 16,679 501 3.00 
2002 1,439 88 13,499 176 1.30 
2003 1,472 85 13,792 179 1.30 
2004 1,477 76 13,820 160 1.16 
2005 1,455 75 13,582 145 1.07 
2006 1,413 80 13,372 169 1.26 
2007 1,430 70 13,338 145 1.09 
2008 1,443 51 13,754 109 0.79 
2009 1,476 42 13,815 90 0.65 
Total 21,758 1,610 207,309 3,908 25.08 
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Table 2:  Designated Directors and Designated Firms by Industry 
The table depicts the industry classification of the data in the RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) database for all directors (designated and non-designated) for the 
years 1996 – 2009.  This is shown for four sub-samples, including the firm level (for all firms and for firms with at least one designated director), and the 
director-level (for all directors and for all designated directors).  Standard industrial classification (SIC) codes are obtained from Compustat, and industry 
classification is categorized at the two digit level.  As in Agrawal and Nasser (2010), Fama-French 12 industry classifications from Kenneth French‘s website are 
used: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.    
 
Industry 
All Firms Designated Firms 
Non-Designated 
Firms 
All Directors 
Designated 
Directors 
Non-Designated 
Directors 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Consumer Non 
Durables 
1,147 6.55 123 11.01 1,024 6.25 11,404 6.88 290 11.02 11,114 6.81 
Consumer Durables 443 2.53 24 2.15 419 2.56 4,055 2.45 42 1.60 4,013 2.46 
Manufacturing 2,366 13.52 124 11.10 2,242 13.68 22,129 13.35 257 9.77 21,872 13.41 
Energy 658 3.76 33 2.95 625 3.81 5,991 3.61 61 2.32 5,930 3.63 
Chemicals and 
Allied Products 
578 3.30 47 4.21 531 3.24 5,866 3.54 116 4.41 5,750 3.52 
Business Equipment 3,019 17.25 133 11.91 2,886 17.61 23,785 14.35 287 10.91 23,498 14.40 
Telecommunications  331 1.89 96 8.59 235 1.43 3,602 2.17 332 12.62 3,270 2.00 
Utilities 1,065 6.09 32 2.86 1,033 6.30 11,518 6.95 63 2.39 11,455 7.02 
Wholesale, Retail, 
and Some Services 
2,041 11.66 72 6.45 1,969 12.02 18,807 11.34 162 6.16 18,645 11.43 
Healthcare 1,377 7.87 93 8.33 1,284 7.84 12,112 7.31 212 8.06 11,900 7.29 
Financials 2,536 14.49 200 17.91 2,336 14.26 29,062 17.53 516 19.61 28,546 17.50 
Other 1,940 11.09 140 12.53 1,800 10.99 17,446 10.52 293 11.14 17,153 10.51 
Total 17,501 100.00 1,117 100.00 16,384 100.00 165,777 100.00 2,631 100.00 163,146 100.00 
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Table 3:  Incidence of Designated Directors and Designated Firms by Tenure 
This table shows the data in the RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) database for all directors for the years 1996 – 2009.  Firm level governance data are obtained from 
the legacy IRRC database (gset) and current governance data from the RiskMetrics database (rmgovernance).  Director level data are obtained from the legacy 
IRRC database (directors) and current director data from the RiskMetrics database (rmdirectors).  The table shows the number of firms with new directors and 
continuing.  This is shown for four sub-samples, including the firm level (for all firms and for firms with at least one designated director), and the director-level 
(for all directors and for all designated directors).   At the firm-level, a firm is counted once if it has at least one director meeting the requirement for that firm-
year (e.g. in 1998 there were 414 firms who had at least one new director appointed on a board).  A director is classified as a new director if it is the first year that 
the director is shown on the company‘s annual proxy statement (i.e. has tenure less than or equal to one year), and a continuing director is one who has been a 
director on the board for more than one year. 
 
Year 
All Firms Designated Firms Non-Designated Firms All Directors Designated Directors 
Non-Designated 
Directors 
New 
Director 
(N) 
Continuing 
(N) 
New 
Director 
(N) 
Continuing 
(N) 
New 
Director 
(N) 
Continuing 
(N) 
New 
Director 
(N) 
Continuing 
(N) 
New 
Director 
(N) 
Continuing 
(N) 
New 
Director 
(N) 
Continuing 
(N) 
1996 0 1,342 0 0 0 1,342 0 14,879 0 258 0 14,621 
1997 0 1,471 0 0 0 1,471 0 15,631 0 247 0 15,383 
1998 1,125 1,686 114 153 1,011 1,533 2,579 14,469 236 340 2,343 14,128 
1999 1,126 1,720 117 147 1,009 1,573 2,570 14,857 224 352 2,346 14,505 
2000 1,112 1,681 115 136 997 1,545 2,501 14,174 234 343 2,267 13,831 
2001 1,112 1,736 98 135 1,014 1,601 2,447 14,232 171 330 2,276 13,902 
2002 933 1,407 32 65 901 1,342 1,891 11,608 61 115 1,830 11,493 
2003 984 1,445 36 62 948 1,383 1,910 11,882 60 119 1,850 11,763 
2004 1,050 1,454 27 57 1,023 1,397 2,080 11,740 45 115 2,035 11,625 
2005 964 1,436 23 61 941 1,375 1,913 11,669 37 108 1,876 11,561 
2006 926 1,381 41 51 885 1,330 1,760 11,612 77 92 1,683 11,520 
2007 938 1,395 33 43 905 1,352 1,799 11,539 66 79 1,733 11,460 
2008 892 1,425 20 42 872 1,383 1,797 11,957 28 81 1,769 11,876 
2009 867 1,463 12 38 855 1,425 1,575 12,240 14 76 1,561 12,164 
Total 12,029 21,042 668 990 11,361 20,052 24,822 182,489 1,253 2,655 23,569 179,832 
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Table 4: Entrenchment and Governance Summary Statistics 
Firm-level governance data are obtained from the legacy IRRC database (gset) and current governance data from the RiskMetrics 
database (rmgovernance).  The RiskMetrics governance database was last updated through 2009.  RiskMetrics includes data from 
nine published volumes: September, 1990; July, 1993; July, 1995; February, 1998; November, 1999; February, 2002; 2004; 
2006; and 2009.  The G-index equals the number of anti-takeover provisions in a firm out of 24 different bylaws, charter 
provisions, and state laws, with higher G-index scores indicating weaker shareholder rights provisions in place (Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick 2003).  The E-index consists of 6 different anti-takeover provisions from bylaws and charter amendments, where 
higher E-index scores indicate more entrenched firms (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009). 
 
Table 4 Panel A:  Incidence and Mean Governance Index 
Year 
All Firms 
(N) 
All Firms 
Mean G-index 
Designated 
Firms 
(N) 
Designated 
Firms 
Mean G-index 
Non-
Designated 
Firms 
(N) 
Non-
Designated 
Firms 
Mean G-index 
1998 1,733 8.81 221 7.99 1,512 8.92 
2000 1,532 8.99 164 8.04 1,368 9.11 
2002 1,363 9.43 83 9.00 1,280 9.45 
2004 1,399 9.40 71 8.80 1,328 9.44 
2006 1,316 9.30 71 9.11 1,245 9.31 
2007 1,002 9.29 39 9.49 963 9.28 
2008 1,192 9.20 38 9.39 1,154 9.19 
2009 1,169 9.16 27 8.85 1,142 9.17 
 Total = 10,706 Average = 9.20 Total = 714 Average = 8.83 Total = 9,992 Average = 9.23 
 
Table 4 Panel B:  Incidence and Mean Entrenchment Index 
Year 
All Firms 
(N) 
All Firms 
Mean E-index 
Designated 
Firms 
(N) 
Designated 
Firms 
Mean E-index 
Non-
Designated 
Firms 
(N) 
Non-
Designated 
Firms 
Mean E-index 
1998 1,733 2.00 221 1.70 1,512 2.05 
2000 1,532 2.14 164 1.73 1,368 2.19 
2002 1,363 2.37 83 2.29 1,280 2.38 
2004 1,399 2.39 71 2.21 1,328 2.40 
2006 1,316 2.30 71 2.28 1,245 2.31 
2007 1,110 3.51 47 3.60 1,063 3.51 
2008 1,435 3.28 50 3.08 1,385 3.29 
2009 1,474 3.66 42 3.43 1,432 3.67 
 Total = 11,362 Average = 2.71 Total = 749 Average = 2.54 Total = 10,613 Average = 2.73 
 
Table 4 Panel C:  Correlation Matrix of the Entrenchment Index and Governance Index for 1990 – 2009 
 
All Firms Designated Firms Non-Designated Firms 
G-index E-index G-index E-index G-index E-index 
G-index 1 - 1 - 1 - 
E-index 0.5962 1 0.7135 1 0.5849 1 
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Table 4 (Continued):   
This table shows the G-index and E-index for firm-years for all firms, designated firms (a firm that has at least one designated 
director on board), and non-designated firms.  A director is classified as a new director if it is the first year that the director is 
shown on the company‘s annual proxy statement (i.e. has tenure less than or equal to one year), and a continuing director is one 
who has been a director on the board for more than one year.  A new designated firm is a firm that has at least one new 
designated director on its board, and a continuing designated firm is one that has at least one continuing designated director on its 
board. 
  
Table 4 Panel D:  Firm-level Mean Governance Index 
Year 
All Firms G-index Designated Firms G-index Non-Designated Firms G-index 
New Director Continuing New Director Continuing New Director Continuing 
1998 8.98 8.80 8.37 7.55 9.05 8.92 
2000 9.12 8.98 8.45 7.58 9.19 9.10 
2002 9.57 9.43 8.48 9.03 9.61 9.46 
2004 9.43 9.41 8.80 8.69 9.45 9.44 
2006 9.41 9.29 9.80 8.52 9.39 9.32 
2007 9.32 9.28 9.84 9.22 9.30 9.27 
2008 9.24 9.20 9.31 9.60 9.24 9.19 
2009 9.21 9.16 8.71 8.92 9.21 9.17 
Average 9.29 9.19 8.97 8.64 9.31 9.23 
 
Table 4 Panel E:  Firm-level Mean Entrenchment Index 
Year 
All Firms E-index Designated Firms E-index Non-Designated Firms E-index 
New Director Continuing New Director Continuing New Director Continuing 
1998 2.08 1.99 1.98 1.48 2.10 2.04 
2000 2.19 2.14 1.91 1.53 2.22 2.19 
2002 2.39 2.37 2.10 2.28 2.40 2.38 
2004 2.39 2.39 2.28 2.13 2.39 2.40 
2006 2.32 2.30 2.46 2.09 2.32 2.30 
2007 3.54 3.51 3.91 3.46 3.53 3.51 
2008 3.30 3.28 3.42 3.00 3.30 3.29 
2009 3.66 3.66 3.25 3.39 3.67 3.67 
Average 2.73 2.71 2.66 2.42 2.74 2.72 
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Table 5 Panel A: Univariate Summary Statistics for Firm-Level Variables 
This table reports mean, median, and standard deviation values for firm and governance characteristics in firms with at least one designated director versus those firms without any, as extracted from the 
RiskMetrics databases. Panels A (B) (C) show univariate comparisons of mean and median values of variables, testing t-statistics for differences in means and z-statistics of the Wilcoxon rank sum test 
for differences in distributions, between designated directors and non-designated directors (Panel A at the firm-level and Panels B and C at the director-level). Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels in two-tailed tests is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively, for the difference in means and a, b, and c for the Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences in the medians.  For designated firms, firm 
characteristics are from Compustat and are measured in the fiscal year-end prior to the annual meeting. Tobin‘s Q is (Book Value of Assets – Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity) / Book 
Value of Assets.  All variables are described in detail in Table 9.  Return on Assets (ROA) is calculated as Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by Total Assets [IB/AT].  Leverage is Debt/ Total 
Assets [(DLC+DLTT)/AT].  Governance characteristics are collected from RiskMetrics. Missing information was collected from firm DEF14A annual proxy statements, 8-K filings, Lexis-Nexis, 
company websites, and annual reports.  The G-index is that reported by Gompers et al. (2003), with higher numbers indicating less shareholder-friendly provisions or worse overall governance. The E-
index is up to 6 different anti-takeover provisions, where higher index scores indicate more entrenched firms (Bebchuk et al. 2009).  RiskMetrics reports the G-index and E-index for firms through 2009.  
 
 Designated Firms Non-Designated Firms 
Variables N P25 Mean Median P75 St. Dev. N P25 Mean Median P75 St. Dev. 
FIRM-LEVEL FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Market Value of Equity 
(millions) 
1109 680.99 6074.43*** 1666.84 5191.85 15858.96 16330 644.223 7483.53 1570.269 4641.33 24675.39 
Market-to-Book 1109 1.403 2.8352* 2.1380 c 3.6771 7.6591 16330 1.5161 3.5800 2.2425 3.6143 46.6022 
Cash Flows/Sales 1066 0.0093 0.0099 0.0512 a 0.0962 0.3041 15772 0.0249 -0.0184 0.0597 0.1053 3.4533 
ROA 1109 0.0068 0.0207*** 0.0303 a 0.0666 0.1271 16333 0.0163 0.0437 0.0473 0.0865 0.1300 
ROE 1109 0.0202 0.0588 0.1012 a 0.1731 0.8529 16333 0.0638 0.0750 0.1229 0.1823 6.4454 
Leverage 1108 0.1420 0.2969*** 0.2646 a 0.4137 0.2283 16281 0.0587 0.2192 0.2054 0.3348 0.1801 
Cash/Assets 1091 0.0119 0.0670*** 0.0317 a 0.0922 0.8701 16058 0.0157 0.0871 0.0442 0.1200 0.1079 
Total Assets (millions) 1110 832.87 15636.84 1916.65 a 5516 71678.83 16333 581.897 12128.89 1647.517 5638.75 67709.29 
Sales Growth (%) 1099 0.0280 0.2840** 0.1196 a 0.2799 2.0528 16224 0.0133 0.1509 0.0918 0.2006 0.8622 
Free Cash Flow (millions) 1110 42.489 424.5966 113.126 371.543 1416.083 16333 39.368 477.9398 109.078 343.563 1721.558 
Capital Expenditures to Assets 1047 0.0206 0.0540 0.0386 0.0723 0.0552 15651 0.01999 0.0553 0.0400 0.0717 0.0565 
Operating Income (millions) 1080 86.24 1082.381 202.922 594.869 4228.262 16003 72.985 936.8478 191.834 599.751 3341.714 
Tobin‘s Q 921 1.1084 1.8833
*** 1.4175 a 2.0208 1.908 13876 1.1480 2.0648 1.5263 2.2661 2.0851 
FIRM-LEVEL GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
Board size 1610 8 10.5963*** 10 a 12 3.2034 20147 7 9.4347 9 11 2.8241 
% Independent 1583 33.3333 49.9779*** 50 a 64.2857 19.5049 20117 57.1429 68.3519 71.4286 81.8182 16.7558 
% Insiders (Employees) 1596 11.1111 18.9133*** 16.6667 a 25 10.2527 20091 11.1111 20.2916 16.6667 25 11.4472 
Classified Board 681 0 0.5932*** 1 a 1 0.4916 8828 0 0.6912 1 1 0.4620 
Poison Pill 645 0 0.4279*** 0 a 1 0.4952 8005 0 0.6478 1 1 0.4777 
G-index 714 6 8.83*** 8 a 10 2.6751 9992 7 9.23 9 11 0.26173 
E-index 749 1 2.54*** 2 a 3 1.4177 10613 2 2.73 3 4 1.3953 
Table 5 (Continued) Panel B: Univariate Summary Statistics for Director-Level Variables 
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 Designated Directors Non-Designated Directors 
Variables N P25 Mean Median P75 St. Dev. N P25 Mean Median P75 St. Dev. 
DIRECTOR-LEVEL GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
Director Age 3905 47 54.3798*** 55 a 62 10.4066 203255 54 59.8196 60 66 8.7508 
Female 3650 0 0.0627*** 0 a 0 0.2425 188772 0 0.1015 0 0 0.3020 
Tenure 3390 1 4.0469*** 2 a 5 5.4698 173225 0 8.5652 6 12 10.4912 
Nominating Committee 
Member 
3151 0 0.2041*** 0 a 0 0.4031 145439 0 0.3615 0 1 0.4804 
Compensation Committee 
Member 
3181 0 0.3219*** 0 a 1 0.4673 144875 0 0.4070 0 1 0.4913 
Audit Committee Member 3145 0 0.2420*** 0 a 0 0.4283 145147 0 0.4228 0 1 0.4940 
Corporate Governance 
Committee Member 
3403 0 0.0882*** 0 a 0 0.2836 173385 0 0.1650 0 0 0.3712 
Nominating Chairman 1674 0 0.0329*** 0 a 0 0.1783 52979 0 0.1140 0 0 0.3178 
Compensation Chairman 2497 0 0.0477*** 0 a 0 0.2131 120459 0 0.1148 0 0 0.3188 
Audit Chairman 2502 0 0.0312*** 0 a 0 0.1738 120546 0 0.1154 0 0 0.3195 
Succession Committee Exists 3908 0 0.0215*** 0 a 0 0.1450 203401 0 0.0617 0 0 0.2406 
Number of Other Outside 
Public Directorships 
3389 0 0.8029** 0 a 1 1.2702 173285 0 0.8578 0 1 1.2167 
Nominee for Election 3228 0 0.5597*** 1 a 1 0.4965 140399 0 0.4440 0 1 0.4967 
Nonattendance (=1) 3908 0 0.0617*** 0 a 0 0.2405 203401 0 0.0184 0 0 0.1344 
Hold Less Than 1% Voting 
Power 
2997 0 0.5873*** 1 a 1 0.4924 132274 0 0.8553 1 1 0.3518 
Percent Control of Voting 
Power 
3226 0 6.2586*** 0 a 2.08 15.5950 132481 0 1.5210 0 0 23.3239 
Interlocking Directorship 3908 0 0.0115* 0 b 0 0.1067 203401 0 0.0083 0 0 0.0909 
Grey Director (=1) 3908 1 0.9220*** 1 b 1 0.2683 203401 0 0.3151 0 1 0.4646 
Ethnicity (Minority=1) 1298 0 0.1240*** 0 c 1 0.3298 98092 0 0.0900 0 0 0.2863 
Grandfathered Upon 
Retirement 
3908 0 0.0031 0   0 0.0556 92522 0 0.0040 0 0 0.0628 
Non-Employee Serving as a 
Chairman 
3908 0 0.0005** 0 b 0 0.0226 203401 0 0.0022 0 0 0.0467 
Lead Director 3908 0 0.0005*** 0 a 0 0.0226 203401 0 0.0037 0 0 0.0606 
Financial Expert 3908 0 0.0072*** 0 a 0 0.0844 203401 0 0.0278 0 0 0.1643 
Number of Shares Held 3398 1000 5,171,075*** 19,211 a 528,210 0.0000 173269 9901 1,247,704 35395 180030 0.0000 
Voting Power (millions) 2735 37.9 206.0*** 87.1 a 185.0 392.0 95602 27.7 174.0 57.6 144 441 
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Table 5 (Continued) Panel C: Univariate Summary Statistics for Director-Level Variables 
 
 Designated Directors Non-Designated Directors 
Variables N P25 Mean Median P75 St. Dev. N P25 Mean Median P75 St. Dev. 
DIRECTOR AFFILIATION           
Former Employee 3564 0 0.0449* 0 
c 0 0.2071 162838 0 0.0513 0 0 0.2206 
Charity Relationship 3908 0 0.0008 0 0 0.0277 203401 0 0.0012 0 0 0.0340 
Business Transaction 3908 0 0.2085*** 0 
a 0 0.4063 203401 0 0.0227 0 0 0.1488 
Relative 3908 0 0.0197*** 0 
a 0 0.1390 203401 0 0.0133 0 0 0.1146 
Professional Services 3908 0 0.0967*** 0 
a 0 0.2956 203401 0 0.0506 0 0 0.2192 
DIRECTOR’S EMPLOYMENT TITLE            
President 3908 0 0.1208*** 0 
a  0 0.3259 203401 0 0.1797 0 0 0.3839 
Chairman 3908 0 0.1105*** 0 
a  0 0.3136 203401 0 0.1787 0 0 0.3831 
CEO 3908 0 0.1356*** 0 
a 0 0.3424 203401 0 0.2107 0 0 0.4078 
CFO 3908 0 0.0274*** 0 
a 0 0.1632 203401 0 0.0194 0 0 0.1380 
COO 3908 0 0.0174*** 0 
a 0 0.1308 203401 0 0.0267 0 0 0.1612 
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix for Selected Financial and Corporate Governance Firm-Level Variables 
This table presents Pearson product moment correlations among independent variables.  The sample consists of 21,758 firm-years (including designated and non-
designated firms), for the years 1996 – 2009.  Financial data are from Compustat, and board composition and governance data are from RiskMetrics governance 
database.  Variable definitions appear in Table 9.  Industry ROA is computed as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets net of the median for 
all firms in the same two-digit SIC code.  Standard industrial classification (SIC) codes are obtained from Compustat, and industry classification is categorized at 
the two digit level.  As in Agrawal and Nasser (2010), Fama-French 12 industry classifications from Kenneth French‘s website are used: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html  
***
, 
**
, and
 *
, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
Market 
Value of 
Equity 
Industry 
ROA 
Leverage 
Sales 
Growth 
(%) 
Tobin’s Q 
Board 
Size 
% 
Independen
t Board 
Classified 
Board 
Poison 
Pill 
G-index E-index 
Market Value 
of Equity 
1 
          
Industry ROA 0.07298 
*** 1 
         
Leverage -0.0028 -0.1286 
*** 1 
        
Sales Growth 
(%) 
0.0024 -0.0039 0.0203 *** 1 
       
Tobin’s Q 0.1241 
*** 0.1452 *** -0.2103 *** 0.0853 *** 1 
      
Board Size 0.2259 
*** 0.0107 0.1497 *** -0.0296 *** -0.1444 *** 1 
     
% Independent 
Board 
0.0590 *** -0.0084 0.0273 *** -0.0452 *** -0.0683 *** 0.0864 *** 1 
    
Classified 
Board 
-0.1369 *** -0.0034 0.0029 -0.0200 * -0.1162 *** 0.0686 *** 0.1784 *** 1 
   
Poison Pill -0.1226 
*** -0.0181 0.0106 -0.0245 ** -0.0770 *** -0.0160 0.2981 *** 0.2935 *** 1 
  
G-index -0.0511 
*** 0.0226 ** 0.0781 *** -0.0264 ** -0.1207 *** 0.2243 *** 0.2219 *** 0.4887 *** 0.4298 *** 1 
 
E-index -0.1371 
*** -0.0270 *** 0.0300 *** -0.0254** -0.1632 *** 0.0855 *** 0.3273 *** 0.6640 *** 0.6413*** 0.5962 *** 1 
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Table 7: Shareholder Response to Designated Directors   
The table reports the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the appointment of designated directors.  The 
appointment date is the annual meeting date, as identified from each company‘s DEF14A proxy statement.  A 
director is classified as a new director if it is the first year that the director is shown on the company‘s annual proxy 
statement (i.e. has tenure less than or equal to one year), and a continuing director is one who has been a director on 
the board for more than one year.  The full sample is all director appointments, both designated and non-designated, 
from the RiskMetrics directors database.  Market model parameters are estimated in the 255-day period ending 46 
days prior to the announcement.  Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are reported in the 2-day 
announcement period [0,+1], and median CARs are listed immediately below, followed by the percentage of CARs 
that are positive are in square brackets. 
***
,
 **
, and 
*
 indicate the mean is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively, using the cross-sectional two-sided t-statistic of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 
(1991) to control for event-induced increase in the variance of the abnormal returns around the announcement.  
a
, 
b
, 
and 
c
 indicate the mean is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using the 
standardized residual two-sided test in Patell (1976).  
)))
, 
))
, and 
)
 indicate the results of a Wilcoxon rank sum test for 
differences in the medians, significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
>>>
, 
>>
, and 
>
 indicate 
the percentage of positive CARs is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, 
using the generalized sign test in Cowan (1992), which controls for the normal asymmetry of positive and negative 
abnormal returns in the estimation period.   
+++
, 
++
, and 
+
 indicate the mean of two independent samples is 
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using the standardized residual test in 
Patell (1976). 
 
Table 7 Panel A: Full Sample   
Event 
Window 
[0,+1] 
(1) 
Full Sample (All Firms) 
  
Designated 
Directors 
Non-
Designated 
Directors 
Difference       
N 1,361 16,678        
Mean CAR -0.09% 0.19%***, a 0.12%       
Median CAR -0.24% ) 0.08% )))        
Positive 
CARs 
[45.33%] [51.29%]>>>        
 
Table 7 Panel B: New versus Continuing Designated Directors 
Event 
Window 
[0,+1] 
Full Sample (All Firms) Full Sample (All Firms) 
New Director 
(2) 
Continuing Director 
(3) 
Designated 
Directors 
Non-
Designated 
Directors 
Difference 
Designated 
Directors 
Non-
Designated 
Directors 
Difference 
N 782 12,070  811 13,646  
Mean CAR -0.42%***, a 0.17%***, a 0.42%+++ 0.26% 0.20%***, a -0.07% 
Median CAR -0.32% ))) 0.07% )))  0.10% 0.09% )))  
Positive 
CARs 
[43.09%]> [51.04%]>>>  [51.66%]> [51.54%]>>>  
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Table 7 (Continued): Shareholder Response to Designated Directors   
The table reports the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the appointment of designated directors.  The appointment date is the 
annual meeting date, as identified from each company‘s DEF14A proxy statement.  A director is classified as a new director if it is the first year 
that the director is shown on the company‘s annual proxy statement (i.e. has tenure less than or equal to one year), and a continuing director is 
one who has been a director on the board for more than one year. The full sample is all director appointments, both designated and non-
designated, from the RiskMetrics directors database.  The sub-samples are formed based on each entrenchment proxy and governance proxy, as 
well as industry classification.  Low-E and Low-G firms have E-indices and G-indices that are less than the full sample median E-index and G-
index based on each year, while high-E and high-G companies have E-indices and G-indices that are greater than or equal to the median.  The 
latest index available prior to the annual meeting of the year based upon dates for which the indices were constructed.  Market model parameters 
are estimated in the 255-day period ending 46 days prior to the announcement.  Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are reported in the 
2-day announcement period [0,+1], and median CARs are listed immediately below, followed by the percentage of CARs that are positive are in 
square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate the mean is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using the cross-
sectional two-sided t-statistic of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) to control for event-induced increase in the variance of the abnormal 
returns around the announcement.  a, b, and c indicate the mean is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, 
using the standardized residual two-sided test in Patell (1976).  ))), )), and ) indicate the results of a Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences in the 
medians, significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  >>>, >>, and > indicate the percentage of positive CARs is significantly 
different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using the generalized sign test in Cowan (1992), which controls for the normal 
asymmetry of positive and negative abnormal returns in the estimation period.   +++, ++, and + indicate the mean of two independent samples is 
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using the standardized residual test in Patell (1976). 
 
Table 7 Panel C: Designated Directors Sub-Sample 
Event 
Window 
[0,+1] 
G-Index 
(4) 
E-Index 
(5) 
Industry 
(6) 
Low-G High-G Difference Low-E High-E Difference 
Non-
Financial 
Firms 
Financial 
Firms 
Difference 
N 1,094 267  1,024 337  758 161  
Mean 
CAR 
-0.25%***,a 0.83%***,a 1.01%+++ -0.24%**, b 0.69%***, a 0.89%+++ -0.07% 0.32% 0.26% 
Median 
CAR 
-0.35% ))) 0.28% )))  -0.35% ))) 0.18% ))  -0.23% 0.20%  
Positive 
CARs 
[43.42%]>> [55.43%]>>>  [43.46%]>> [53.12%]>>  [46.17%] [53.42%]  
 
Table 7 Panel D: Designated G-Index 
Event 
Window 
[0,+1] 
New Designated Directors 
(7) 
Continuing Designated Directors 
(8) 
Low-G High-G Difference Low-G High-G Difference 
N 647 135  647 164  
Mean 
CAR 
-0.60%***, a 0.88%* 1.44%+++ -0.04% 0.69%***, a 0.65% 
Median 
CAR 
-0.51% ))) 0.12%  -0.28% 0.45% ))  
Positive 
CARs 
[41.11%]>>> [53.33%]  [45.75%] [56.71%]>>  
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Table 7 (Continued): Shareholder Response to Designated Directors   
The table reports the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the appointment of designated directors.  The appointment date is the 
annual meeting date, as identified from each company‘s DEF14A proxy statement.  A director is classified as a new director if it is the first year 
that the director is shown on the company‘s annual proxy statement (i.e. has tenure less than or equal to one year), and a continuing director is 
one who has been a director on the board for more than one year. The full sample is all director appointments, both designated and non-
designated, from the RiskMetrics directors database.  The sub-samples are formed based on each entrenchment proxy and governance proxy, as 
well as industry classification.  Low-E and Low-G firms have E-indices and G-indices that are less than the full sample median E-index and G-
index based on each year, while high-E and high-G companies have E-indices and G-indices that are greater than or equal to the median.  The 
latest index available prior to the annual meeting of the year based upon dates for which the indices were constructed.  Market model parameters 
are estimated in the 255-day period ending 46 days prior to the announcement.  Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are reported in the 
2-day announcement period [0,+1], and median CARs are listed immediately below, followed by the percentage of CARs that are positive are in 
square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate the mean is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using the cross-
sectional two-sided t-statistic of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) to control for event-induced increase in the variance of the abnormal 
returns around the announcement.  a, b, and c indicate the mean is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, 
using the standardized residual two-sided test in Patell (1976).  ))), )), and ) indicate the results of a Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences in the 
medians, significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  >>>, >>, and > indicate the percentage of positive CARs is significantly 
different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using the generalized sign test in Cowan (1992), which controls for the normal 
asymmetry of positive and negative abnormal returns in the estimation period.   +++, ++, and + indicate the mean of two independent samples is 
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using the standardized residual test in Patell (1976). 
 
 
Table 7 Panel E: Designated E-Index 
Event Window 
[0,+1] 
New Designated Directors 
(9) 
Continuing Designated Directors 
(10) 
Low-E High-E Difference Low-E High-E Difference 
N 605 177  602 209  
Mean CAR -0.58%***, a 0.58% 1.15%+++ 0.22% 0.60%**, b 0.58% 
Median CAR -0.53% ))) 0.09%  0.10% 0.25% ))  
Positive CARs [40.66%]>>> [51.41%]  [51.66%] 53.59%>  
 
 
Table 7 Panel F: Non-Designated G-Index 
Event Window 
[0,+1] 
New Non-Designated Directors 
(11) 
Continuing Non-Designated Directors 
(12) 
Low-G High-G Difference Low-G High-G Difference 
N 9222 2848  9565 4081  
Mean CAR 0.17%***, a 0.26%***, a 0.09%+++ 0.19%***, a 0.30%***, a 0.29%+++ 
Median CAR 0.04% ))) 0.14% )))  0.08% ))) 0.17% )))  
Positive CARs [50.72%]>>> [52.81%]>>>  [51.27%]>>> [53.32%]>>>  
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Table 8: Likelihood of Designated Firm 
This table reports logit regressions estimating the likelihood of designated directors on a firm‘s board, using 
financial data and corporate governance firm-level characteristics as the key explanatory variables.  The dependent 
variable =1 if the firm has at least one designated director on its board, and 0 otherwise.  For specification (2) the 
dependent variable =1 if the firm as at least one new designated director, and for specification (3) the dependent 
variable =1 if the firm has at least one continuing designated director.  A director is classified as a new designated 
director if it is the first year that the designated director is shown on the company‘s annual proxy statement (i.e. has 
tenure less than or equal to one year), and a continuing designated director is one who has been a designated director 
on the board for more than one year. Independent variable definitions appear in Appendix A.  All independent 
variables are measured in the year prior to classifying the observation as designated or non-designated, with the 
exception of the E-index, which ranges from zero to two prior years, depending on the RiskMetrics publication year.  
Two-tailed p-values for the coefficient estimates are reported underneath, and 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  The marginal effects column shows the effects of adding 
designated directors to a one unit change in the variable of interest after standardizing the independent variables. 
Marginal effects are computed as: β*π(X)*[1-π(X)], whereπ (X ) = eβ 'X (1 + eβ 'X ) and β’X is evaluated at 
the mean values of X.  For the binary variables classified board and poison pill, the marginal effect calculates the 
change from going from 0 to 1. 
 
 
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 S
ig
n
 (1) 
 
 
Designated Firm 
(2) 
 
Designated Firm:   
New Designated Director 
(3) 
 
Designated Firm:   
Continuing Designated Director 
Independent Variables 
(A) 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(B) 
Marginal 
Effect 
(A) 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(B) 
Marginal 
Effect 
(A) 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(B) 
Marginal 
Effect 
E-Index t-1 + 0.179
** 0.006 0.161 0.003 0.242 *** 0.005 
Firm Level Financial Control Variables 
Market Value of Equity 
(millions) t-1  
– -0.000 *** -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 *** -0.000 
Industry ROA t-1 – -0.846
* -0.029 -1.300 ** -0.026 -0.067 -0.001 
Leverage t-1 + 2.104
 *** 0.071 2.130 *** 0.042 1.861 *** 0.041 
Sales Growth (%) t – -0.017 -0.001 0.500
 *** 0.010 -0.126 -0.003 
Tobin’s Q t-1 – 0.044 0.001 0.020 0.000 0.063 0.001 
Governance Level Financial Control Variables 
Board Size t-1 + 0.169
 *** 0.006 0.187 ***  0.004 0.170 *** 0.004 
% Independent 
Directors t 
– -0.056 *** -0.002 -0.063 *** -0.001 -0.062 *** -0.001 
Classified Board t-1 – -0.275
 * -0.010 0.152 0.003 -0.609 *** -0.015 
Poison Pill t-1 – -0.529
*** -0.019 -0.276 -0.006 -0.825*** -0.021 
Constant  -1.541 ***  -2.159 ***  -1.246***  
N  1,202 540 923 
Pseudo R2  0.1807 0.2176 0.2031 
Prob > 2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 9: Variable Name Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
Designated Director 
=1 if the director is designated; i.e. a designee under a documented agreement by a 
group, such as a union or significant shareholder, or a majority holder, or employee of 
majority holder at the time of the annual meeting; =0 otherwise (non-designated 
director) 
Designated Firm 
=1 if the firm has at least one designated director on the board at the time of the 
annual meeting 
Non-Designated Firm 
=1 if the firm has no designated directors on the board at the time of the annual 
meeting 
New Director 
=1 if the director has a tenure less than or equal to one year on the board (tenure<=1); 
=0 otherwise 
Continuing Director 
=1 if the director has a tenure more than one year on the board (tenure>1); =0 
otherwise 
New Designated Firm 
=1 if the firm has at least one new director who also is designated on its board at the 
time of the annual meeting; =0 otherwise 
Continuing Designated Firm 
=1 if the firm has at least one continuing director who also is designated on its board 
at the time of the annual meeting; =0 otherwise 
Low-G 
=1 if the firm has a G-index that is less than the full sample median G-index for that 
year 
High-G 
=1 if the firm has a G-index that is greater than or equal to the full sample median G-
index for that year 
Low-E 
=1 if the firm has a E-index that is less than the full sample median E-index for that 
year 
High-E 
=1 if the firm has a E-index that is greater than or equal to the full sample median E-
index for that year 
FINANCIAL FIRM-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS 
From Compustat; Data are for year prior to the annual meeting date (t-1) 
Market Value of Equity (millions) = Price at year close * Common Shares Outstanding (PRCC_F * CSHO) 
Market-to-Book = MarketCap / Stockholders Equity (MkCap / SEQ) 
Cash Flows/Sales = Cash / Sales (IBC / SALE) 
ROA 
The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, net of the median for all 
firms in the same two-digit SIC code. 
= Income Before Extraordinary Items / Total Assets (IB / AT) 
ROE = Net Income / Stockholders‘ Equity  (NI / SEQ) 
Leverage 
= (Debt in Current Liabilities + Long-Term Debt )/ Total Assets  
   (DLC + DLTT) / AT 
Cash/Assets = Cash / Total Assets (CH / AT) 
Log [Total Assets (millions)] 
Firm size is the log of total assets 
= log (AT) 
Sales Growth (%) = (Current year‘s sales – Last year‘s sales) / Last year‘s sales 
Free Cash Flow (millions) 
=  OIBDP – TAX – XINT – DVP – DVC;  
where OpIncome= operating income before depreciation (OIBDP or EBITDA), TAX 
= Total Income Taxes - minus change in deferred taxes from the previous year to the 
current year (TXT-chTXDITC), INTEXP = Interest Expense (either TIE or 
(XINST+XINTD)), DVP = Preferred Dividends, DVC = Common Dividends; (Lehn 
and Poulson 1989) 
Capital Expenditures to Assets = Capital Expenditures / Total Assets (CAPX / AT) 
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Table 9 (Continued): Variable Name Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
Operating Income (millions) = EBITDA 
Tobin‘s Q 
= (Book Value of Assets – Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity) / Book 
Value of Assets; 
     * BVE = SEQ + TXDITC – PSTK  
     * MVE = (ABS(PRC)*SHROUT)/1000  from CRSP; need to adjust scale of  
        shrout  from thousands to millions 
= (AT – BVE + MVE) / AT 
GOVERNANCE FIRM-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS 
From RiskMetrics; Data are for year of the annual meeting, except for the G-index and E-index 
% Independent 
=1 if the director has no material connection to the company other than a board seat; 
=0 otherwise 
% Insiders (Employees) 
=1 if director is (i) employee of the company or affiliate, (ii) among the five most 
highly paid individuals, (iii) listed as an officer, (iv) current interim CEO, or (v) 
beneficial owner of more than 50% of the company‘s voting power; =0 otherwise 
Classified Board 
=1 if the board of directors is divided for the purpose of election into separate classes; 
=0 otherwise 
Poison Pill =1 if the firm has a shareholder rights plan in place; =0 otherwise 
G-index 
= the number of anti-takeover provisions in a firm out of 24 different bylaw, charter 
provisions, and state laws, with higher scores indicating weaker shareholder rights 
provisions in place (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003).   
E-index 
= up to 6 different anti-takeover provisions from bylaws and charter amendments, 
where higher index scores indicate more entrenched firms (Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell 2009). 
GOVERNANCE DIRECTOR-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS 
From RiskMetrics; Data are for year of the annual meeting 
Interlocking Directorship 
=1 if director has interlock including (i) executive officers serving as directors on each 
other‘s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, 
on the board); or (ii) executive officers sitting on each other‘s boards and at least one 
serves on the other‘s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a 
committee, on the board); =0 otherwise 
Grey Director 
=1 if (i) there is a board attestation that an outside director is not independent, (ii) 
director is former CEO, (iii) director is non-CEO executive, (iv) director is a family 
member of current or former employee, (v) director has transactional, professional, 
financial or charitable relationship with company, (vi) director is party to a voting 
agreement to vote in line with management on proposals being brought to shareholder 
vote, (vii) has an interlocking relationship as defined by SEC involving members of 
board or its compensation committee, (viii) director is founder of the company but not 
currently an employee, or (ix) director has any material relationship with the 
company; =0 otherwise 
Ethnicity (Minority) =1 if director is minority; =0 if white 
Financial Expert =1 if director is a financial expert as defined by SOX; =0 otherwise 
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